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Reforming the judicial selection process has long stirred the interests
of lawyers, politicians, bar associations, professors, and judges. Since the
passage of the Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978 and its creation of 152
new federal court positions, interest in reform has increased dramati-
cally. Reforms in judicial selection have focused on the initial recom-
mendation process. Thus, reformers have questioned the basis of
senatorial power in judicial selection: the custom of senatorial courtesy
that allows a senator of the President's party and of the nominee's home
state to select candidates and to block unacceptable nominees for dis-
trict and circuit court positions. These reforms have advocated the use
of screening panels or "merit panels" in federal judicial selection.
This paper compares the initial recommendation procedures for dis-
trict and circuit court judges under the Carter and Reagan administra-
tions. The two administrations adopted different frameworks in
obtaining initial recommendations for these positions and in dealing
with senatorial courtesy. While Carter adopted the panels in order to
open the system to more participants and to increase the representation
of women and minorities, Reagan adopted a more traditional frame-
work in his effort to secure the nomination of persons adhering to the
philosophy of "judicial restraint."
The Carter administration instituted more reforms in judicial selec-
tion than any previous administration. With the passage of the Omni-
bus Judgeship Act of 1978, the Carter administration stepped up its
efforts to open the selection process to greater public participation and
to increase the representation of women and minorities on the federal
bench. The panel system was chosen as a means of accomplishing those
goals. Carter set up his own judicial nominating commission for the
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circuit courts and issued guidelines for senators to follow in making rec-
ommendations for district court positions.1 While Carter also wished to
appoint judges who agreed with him philosophically, the emphasis of
the panels was on increased participation and "affirmative action" in
the judicial selection process.
The Reagan administration is not as concerned with restructuring the
selection process itself. Although it seeks to appoint women and minori-
ties, it does not share the "affirmative action" goal of the Carter admin-
istration. In addition to appointing highly qualified judges, the chief
goal that Reagan wishes to accomplish is the appointment of judges
with a conservative judicial philosophy. Since the goals of the Reagan
administration do not concern reforming the selection process itself, it
has been willing to operate within a more traditional framework and to
further its goals while accommodating senatorial courtesy. While "en-
courag[ing senators] to utilize screening mechanisms . . . includ[ing]
• . .advisory groups or commissions," '2 the Reagan administration abol-
ished the presidentially-appointed panels for the circuit court positions
and has not emphasized panels for the district court positions as much
as the Carter administration.
The first part of this paper provides a brief history of judicial selection
and an outline of the initial recommendation procedures of the two ad-
ministrations. The second part of the paper compares the actual opera-
tion of the initial recommendation procedures under the two
administrations as to the use of panels for district judges, the role of
senators in circuit court selection, and the changes in senatorial courtesy
initiated by recent chairmen of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The
actual operation of the initial recommendation procedures can influence
both the accomplishment of the administration's political or ideological
goals in judicial selection and the type of judges selected in terms of
their professional background characteristics. The third part of the pa-
per will examine Carter's goal of "affirmative action" and Reagan's goal
of "judicial restraint" in the context of the selection procedures. The
final part of the analysis asks how different procedures can lead to the
selection of persons with particular professional background characteris-
tics. Several key professional and demographic characteristics of the
1. For a discussion of selection and confirmation procedures under the Carter administra-
tion, see L. BERKSON & S. CARBON, THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE NOMINATING
COMMISSION: ITS MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES (1980); A. NEFF, THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSIONS: THEIR MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND
CANDIDATES (1981); Slotnick, Federal Appellate Judge Selection Reruitmeni Changes and Unan-
swered Questions, 6 JUST. Sys. J. 283 (1980).





nominees will be compared according to the selection process used in
their recommendation. "Panel nominees" will be compared with "non-
panel nominees" in professional experience, age, educational back-
ground, and ABA ratings to explore whether different selection proce-
dures lead to the selection of different types of judges.
I. Brief History ofjudi'ci'al Selection Procedures
The judicial selection process may be divided into three parts: (1) ini-
tial recommendation leading to the selection of one or more candidates,
(2) investigation and screening procedures leading to nomination, and
(3) the confirmation process leading to appointment. 3 The first stage is
often the most crucial since it involves the selection of candidates4 for a
position. The person or group that exercises influence in this area can-
not only block a potential appointment but may also name possible
candidates.
A. Judicial Selecti'on Procedures Prior to the Carter Admhistration
In analyzing the powers of the President and the Senate in the selec-
tion process,5 Hamilton predicted that by exercising the power of nomi-
nation the President would dominate the process. The Senate would
serve only as "an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism."'6 After
Hamilton's time, however, a system developed in which presidential
3. Professor Howard Ball employs a similar analysis in distinguishing participants in the
judicial selection process. He labels actors as "initiators," "screeners," and "affirmers." H.
BALL, COURTS AND POLITICS: THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 178 (1980).
4. Throughout this paper, "applicant" refers to a person who wishes to be considered for
a judicial appointment. "Candidate" refers to a person recommended for nomination by a
senator, congressman, or nominating panel. "Nominees" are persons formally nominated by
the President. "Appointees" are persons confirmed by the Senate for a federal judgeship.
5. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that the President "shall nominate,
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint .. .Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for .. .but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in
the Heads of Departments." Some have suggested that the Constitution is ambiguous as to
the appointment of federal judges in that district and circuit court judges could be considered
"inferior officers." H. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS 4-5 (1972); 2 J.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 400 (Colley 4th ed.
1873).
6. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 457 (A. Hamilton) (Mentor ed. 1961). Hamilton also
wrote, "It will be the office of the President to nominaie, and, with the advice and consent of
the Senate, to appoint. There will, of course, be no exertion of cho.'ce on the part of the Sen-
ate." Id No. 66, at 405 (emphasis original).
The selection of federal judges stirred controversy during the constitutional debates. See
generally, C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 640-42 (1937). The Framers
debated whether the appointment power should rest with the President or the Senate. The
combined selection and confirmation process was a compromise. See generally A. NEFF, supra
note 1, at 1-6; L. BERKSON & S. CARBON, supra note 1, at 9-11.
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power to select judges depended upon whether the appointees were to
fill district, appellate, or Supreme Court vacancies. Home-state senators
of the President's party dominated the initial selection of district court
judges while the President controlled Supreme Court nominations. The
appointment of circuit judges differed according to the circumstances of
each nomination and was to some degree determined by the political
"clout" of the senator and the strength of the tradition that the particu-
lar vacancy "belonged" to his state. 7
The development of senatorial courtesy was instrumental in the sena-
tors' acquisition of influence in the selection of lower court federal
judges. The custom first appeared in non-judicial appointments. Dur-
ing the First Congress, the Senate deferred to the objections of Georgia's
two senators in rejecting the nomination of Benjamin Fishbourn to a
position in the Port of Savannah. When President Washington yielded
by nominating the candidate proposed by Georgia's senators, he estab-
lished a precedent that the President consult with home-state senators
prior to making executive branch nominations. The strength of the pre-
cedent remained in doubt through most of the nineteenth century.
Many presidents, including Washington, asserted a presidential prerog-
ative to choose the person that would be nominated.8 Nevertheless, by
the twentieth century, the senatorial right to be consulted on judicial
nominations often included the power to select the nominee. Hamil-
ton's idea was reversed; it became the President, rather than the Senate,
who operated as the confirming body and as "the excellent check." The
constitutional system "ha[d] been turned on its head." 9
This shift drew severe criticism over the years, largely because of the
extent to which it fostered a system of patronage appointment. "Paro-
chialism, localism, and conservatism are words that have often been
used to categorize the selection of federal district court judges," de-
7. See generally S. GoLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLITICAL SYS-
TEM 58-59 (2d ed. 1976). For a general discussion of the history of the selection process, see
H. CHASE, supra note 5, at 9-22; A. NEFF, supra note 1, at 1-26. Tradition dictates that where
there was no senator of the President's party, the state congressional delegation or party lead-
ership would submit recommendations to the President.
8. See generally J. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 36-98 (1953); K.
HALL, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE 171-72 (1979).
9. Selection and Confumation of FederalJudges. Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judic-
aqy, Part 1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1979) (testimony of David Cohen, President, Common
Cause) [hereinafter cited as Initial Hearing]. See also Hall, The Children of the Cabins.: The Lower
FederalJudi ary, Moodenization, and the Political Culture, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 423, 430 (1980).
During the middle of the nineteenth century, responsibility for judicial nominations within
the executive branch was transferred from the Secretary of State to the Attorney General.
During the Pierce administration (1853-1857), Caleb Cushing became the first attorney gen-
eral to oversee judicial nominations. This practice was followed in the Buchanan administra-
tion. K. HALL, THE PoLrrtcs OF JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 113, 133.
Vol. 1:299, 1983
Judicial Selection Panels
scribed one author.' 0 Criticism charged that in the traditional system of
selecting judges, a candidate's political connections were often more im-
portant considerations than his professional qualifications in getting a
judicial appointment." Some believed that the quality of the federal
bench was not as high as it might have been in a system in which poli-
tics did not play as great a role. 12 Moreover, the "closed-door" appear-
ance of federal judicial selection under the traditional system conveyed
a feeling of impropriety-that judgeships were traded and bartered like
so many votes on the latest pork barrel.' 3 Presidents wishing to influ-
ence the composition of the federal judiciary to further national aims
often found themselves blocked by recalcitrant home-state senators. 14
The senatorial system, however, was not without its advocates. Some
viewed senatorial influence to be an important check on presidential
power. Defenders of senatorial selection argued that only those with
contacts with the state could make an informed choice. That responsi-
bility, they argued, should rest with the state's senators, who could be
held responsible for their decisions by the voters. 15 Given the fewer con-
tacts of the President and his aides with the state, their limited resources,
and the large number of district judges, some sort of delegation to the
local level appeared to be necessary.
Prior to the Carter administration, two reform waves swept judicial
selection. The first of these, associated with the Jacksonian Era (1829-
1837), attempted to make all public offices (including judgeships) elec-
tive. Although many state court selection systems were changed to pop-
ular election, the federal judiciary was unaffected.16 The second reform
wave, the movement for "merit selection," began in the early part of this
century and has continued to affect federal judicial selection to the pres-
ent day. The early proponents of merit selection did not argue that the
10. H. BALL, supra note 3, at 180.
11. H. CHASE, supra note 5, at 28.
12. Totenberg, Wll Judges Be Chosen Rationally?, 60 JUDICATURE 92, 93 (1976).
13. Samuels & Goodman, Open Judgeships Secretly Amved At, NATION, Mar. 24, 1979, at
303.
14. President John F. Kennedy, for instance, had difficulty in securing the appointment
of southern judges who agreed with him on the enforcement of civil rights matters. V.
NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 258-76 (1977).
15. J. HARRIS, supra note 8, at 316. The "patronage" system at times produced humorous
results. One author reported that officials during one administration were particularly per-
plexed by the support of a prominent midwestern senator for a nominee who appeared to lack
both political ties and outstanding credentials. Later, a friend of the senator explained to an
aide: "Hell, . . . -'s just trying to prove to people back home how powerful he is. Any
senator can get a qualified lawyer appointed as a federal judge. But it takes real power to get
an appointment for somebody who is recognized by everybody as obviously not qualified."
Totenberg, supra note 12, at 95-96.
16, A. ASHMAN & J. ALFINI, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE NOMINA-
TING PROCESS 9 (1974).
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senators were the wrong initiators in a political system. Instead, they
argued that the system should not be based on politics at all and advo-
cated the adoption of panels to make nominations or recommend candi-
dates for judicial positions.' 7 The American Judicature Society (AJS)
promoted the "Missouri Plan," which called for selection of a slate of
candidates by a nonpartisan group with final appointment by an elected
official. 18 The plan was adopted by many states 19 and was proposed for
the federal judiciary. 20
The American Bar Association also called for the nonpartisan selec-
tion ofjudges.2 1 Unlike the AJS, the ABA formed its own committee in
1946 to review and rate federal judicial nominations.2 2 In 1952 the ABA
increased its influence by gaining the privilege of reviewing candidates
prior to nomination under the Truman administration.2 3 The ABA's in-
fluence reached a peak when President Eisenhower gave the committee
a virtual veto power. 24 The ABA has continued to influence the selec-
tion process through the Carter and Reagan administrations. Although
it has been charged with substituting a conservative, corporate-firm phi-
losophy for "merit," 25 it has retained its power largely because it pro-
vides an independent source of information that the executive branch
may weigh against that provided by home-state senators. 26 At the same
17. The early proponents of merit selection included Roscoe E. Pound and William How-
ard Taft. Id at 10.
18. Id at 11.
19. Id at 27-37.
20. H. CHASE, supra note 5, at 201-02.
21. Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, 86 A.B.A. REP. 509 (1961).
22. In 1946, the House of Delegates formed a Special Committee on the Judiciary to
review judicial nominations. The ABA committee gained early acceptance with the Senate
Judiciary Committee through its chairman, Senator Alexander Wiley. H. CHASE, supra note
5, at 124.
The ABA ratings are "Not Qualified," "Qualified," "Well Qualified," and "Exceptionally
Well Qualified." In 1981 the Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary eliminated the rating
"Not Qualified by Reason of Age." ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary, Report
to the House of Delegates 2 (Mid-Winter Meeting, 1981).
For a more detailed description of the ABA's role and its development, see J. GROSSMAN,
LAWYERS AND JUDGES: THE ABA AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION (1965).
23. The break for the ABA occurred when Ross Malone, a member of the House of Dele-
gates and the Board of Governors of the ABA, was appointed Deputy Attorney General. H.
CHASE, supra note 5, at 126. Malone felt strongly that the ABA should have a role in the
selection process. Id. at 127. The Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary issues a tentative
report to the Attorney General prior to nomination and gives its formal rating after nomina-
tion. The ABA is pledged to oppose any nominee who is found "Not Qualified." ABA
STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS 8-12
(1977), repnnted in Initial Hearing, supra note 9, at 104-17.
24. H. CHASE, supra note 5, at 91-92.
25. Initial Hearing, supra note 9, at 45 (questioning by Sen. Howard Metzenbaum directed
to Robert D. Raven, Chairman, ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary).
26. J. GROSSMAN, supra note 22, at 155.
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time, the ABA ratings, for better or worse, have become an index of a
president's success in appointing highly-qualified judges.
As the ABA and AJS became more interested in reforming the selec-
tion system, the increasing importance of the lower federal courts in de-
ciding matters of social policy led to greater executive interest in the
selection process. Originally, the district courts were tribunals of ex-
tremely limited jurisdiction. 27 When the circuit trial courts were abol-
ished in 1911, the district courts became the sole courts of original
federal jurisdiction. 28 At least since the Eisenhower administration, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the White House began to take
greater initiatives in the selection process. 29 Executive branch interest
increased particularly in circuit court positions where DOJ officials
could play senators off against one another--especially when more than
one senator claimed the right to make the recommendations. DOJ offi-
cials could also rely on their own sources of information for the more
prominent circuit court positions and consequently did not have to rely
on senators as much for recommending candidates. The greater power
and multi-state character of the circuit courts justified greater attention
from the executive branch.3 0 Scholars concluded that in the administra-
tions preceding Carter's, the executive branch could be considered the
dominant force in circuit court selection.3 1
Although the President set the terms of circuit court selection, the
power of senators remained strong at both the district and circuit court
levels. Senators strengthened their prerogatives in making recommen-
dations and approving nominations through, the "blue slip." The blue
slip, delivered by the Senate Judiciary Committee to both senators of
the nominee's home state, provided that "unless a reply is received from
you within a week from this date, it will be assumed that you have no
27. The jurisdiction of the courts is described in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 76-77.
See also A. NEFF, supra note 1, at 4. Originally, the circuit trial courts were staffed by the
district judges and Supreme Court justices. The Judiciary Act of 1801 would have relieved
Supreme Court justices of this duty, but it was repealed. Surrency, A Hioy of Federal Courts,
28 Mo. L. REV. 214, 215, 219-20 (1963). By 1860, however, it was rare that a Supreme Court
justice would preside on circuit. Id at 223.
28. Judiciary Act of 1911, 36 Stat. 1087.
29. A. NEFF, supra note 1, at 19. See supra text of note 9.
30. Richardson and Vines noted that the President and his aides can take "greater initia-
tive than they can for district judges, because of the multi-state character of the circuits."
Justice Department officials were able to pursue their own choices for circuit court positions,
but even here nominations had to be cleared with the senators. R. RICHARDSON & K. VINES,
THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL COURTS: LOWER COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 63 (1970).
31. Id. See also Goldman, Judicial Appointments to the United States Court of Appeals, 1967
Wisc. L. REV. 186, 188, 213. Senators often claimed that their state had the right to be
represented on the circuit courts and that they had a prerogative to recommend candidates
for "their" vacancies on the circuit.
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objection to this nomination. ' 32 In truth, however, the blue slip came to
mean the opposite, for the understanding was that no action would be
taken in the absence of a returned blue slip. This gave a senator of the
President's party a pocket veto and even expanded senatorial preroga-
tives to a senator who was not of the President's party to at least delay-
if not defeat-a nomination.3 3 As we shall see, although Senator Ken-
nedy changed certain aspects of the blue slip policy in 1979, the blue slip
continues to influence the judicial selection process.
Judicial selection involved a wide array of actors. One writer likened
the selection process to a baseball game in which the number of players
could be expanded indefinitely.34 Sitting judges, interest groups, Con-
gressmen, governors, state party leaders, businessmen, contributors, and
potential nominees could intervene to recommend candidates or to exert
influence in filling a judicial vacancy.
While the process for each nomination varied, the traditional selec-
tion and confirmation process for district and circuit court judges as it
existed prior to the Carter administration can be briefly summarized.
For district court nominations the process usually began with home-
state senators of the President's party (or the congressional delegation or
state party leadership where there was no senator) making recommenda-
tions to the Department of Justice. Most senators made only one recom-
mendation per vacancy, although some made several. Candidates were
then screened by the Department of Justice, the American Bar Associa-
tion, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. After a nominee was cho-
sen, the Senate Judiciary Committee held what critics found to be a
perfunctory hearing that served more to show senatorial support than to
gain any public input.3 5 Confirmation on the Senate floor followed.
The initiation of circuit court nominations prior to the Carter admin-
istration varied among the Department of Justice, the White House, and
senators.3 6 Screening and confirmation procedures for circuit court
judges followed roughly the same procedures for district court judges,
although all bodies scrutinized candidates for circuit court positions
more carefully.
32. The blue slip states that it operates pursuant to a "rule of the Committee." Research
by the Senate Judiciary Committee indicated that no such rule has existed at least since 1969.
STAFF OF SENATE CoMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., SENATORIAL
COURTESY 2, reprinted in Initial Hean'ng, supra note 9, at 119.
33. Slotnick, Refoms in Judiial Selectign Will They Afect the Senate's Role? (pt. 1), 64 JUDI-
CATURE 60, 63 (1980).
34. H. CHASE, supra note 5, at 3-4.
35. Schuck & Kumar,Judizal Nominations: WhitAer Advice and Consat?, in THE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEES 222, 224-41 (P. Schuck ed. 1975).




B. Judicial Selection Procedures under Carter and Reagan
Presidents Carter and Reagan made radically different campaign
pledges regarding the selection of federal judges. Proud of the commis-
sion system he instituted as governor of Georgia, Carter expanded his
promise to create an "independent" federal judiciary by calling for
"merit selection": "All federal judges and prosecutors should be ap-
pointed strictly on the basis of merit without any consideration of polit-
ical aspects or influence. Independent blue ribbon judicial selection
committees should be established to give recommendations to the Presi-
dent of the most qualified persons available for positions when vacancies
occur."
3 7
While Carter's promise attracted only mild attention, the 1980 Re-
publican Party platform, ultimately embraced by President Reagan,
stirred controversy. Although all presidents (including Carter) have
chosen judges on the basis of philosophy, the Republican platform spe-
cifically called for the appointment of judges who had "the highest re-
gard for protecting the rights of law-abiding citizens" and who hold
views "consistent with the belief in the decentralization of the federal
government and efforts to return decision-making power to state and
local elected officials." Most controversially, the plank seemed to be
aimed directly at the Supreme Court's abortion decisions by calling for
judges "who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of inno-
cent human life." a38 Reagan and his aides attempted to deflect criticism,
however, by pointing to the ambiguity in "innocent human life" and by
stressing that no "litmus test" would be used in choosing federal
judges.39
All administrations wish to accomplish ideological objectives by ap-
37. Miller, The Aerit System vs. Patronage, Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1977, at 14, col. 4. The
general reform attitude following the Watergate scandal may have created support for "merit
selection." A. NEFF, supra note 1, at 49. The plan also gained support during the "Marston
affair." Carter's merit pledge extended to federal prosecutors. While the Omnibus Judgeship
Bill of 1978 was pending, Attorney General Bell dismissed United States Attorney David W.
Marston, a Ford appointee. A public furor arose since Marston's office had been investigat-
ing Philadelphia Democratic leaders. G. BELL & R. OSTROW, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW
208-14 (1982). Ironically, this aided Carter's goal of instituting panels. Soon after, the House
of Representatives voted 321-19 to retain language insisting that the President promulgate
"regulations establishing procedures and guidelines" for merit selection. 124 CONG. REC.
2964 (1978). Congress later modified the language by calling for the President to issue "stan-
dards and guidelines." Omnibus Judgeship Act, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 7, 92 Stat. 1633 (1978)
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The act also directed the President to "give due
consideration to qualified individuals regardless of race, color, sex, religion, or national ori-
gin." Id § 8. See generaly, A. NEFF, supra note 1, at 34-35.
38. Rice, Ronald Reagan and the Supreme Court Issue, Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1980, at 34, col. 4.
39. N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1980, at Al, col. 2. Edwin Meese stated that Reagan did not
"have any litmus test in mind." Judging Reagan'sJudges, TIME, Oct. 6, 1980, at 69. The
American Bar Association sharply criticized the Republican platform. N.Y. Times, Aug. 8,
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pointing judges of certain backgrounds or political beliefs. In addition
to its goal of opening up the recommendation system to more partici-
pants and of increasing the diversity of the federal judiciary,40 the
Carter administration also sought judges with moderate to liberal judi-
cial philosophies. 4' Partly in response to its perception of an ideological
imbalance resulting from President Carter's selection of judges for 152
new positions, the Reagan administration has been concerned with ap-
pointing judges who agree with the President philosophically. 4 2 One
current Justice Department official added that the President wished to
appoint qualified people and that the selection of women and minority
group members was consistent with this objective. 43
The two administrations also differ in their selection procedures. The
Carter administration framework focused on creating presidentially-ap-
pointed panels for making recommendations for circuit court vacancies
and actively encouraging senators to establish similar panels for district
court vacancies. The administration moved early to gain acceptance of
the panel idea. Before his inauguration Carter and Griffin Bell met
with Senator James Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee. Although the details of the conversation were not reduced to
writing, Eastland apparently agreed to support the establishment of the
circuit court panels but insisted that senators retain the right to recom-
mend district court nominees. 44 After inauguration, Carter issued an
executive order establishing the United States Circuit Judge Nominat-
ing Commission.4 5 The administration chose circuit court panelists
1980, at A20, col. 1. For a defense of the Reagan administration, see Younger, In Defense ofthe
'Litmus Test', 32 NAT. REv. 1393-94 (Nov. 14, 1980).
40. A. NEFF, supra note 1, at 149.
41. Id at 151.
42. Cohodas, Reagan's Judicial Selections Draw Dffhrt'ng Assessments, 41 CONG. Q. WEEKLY
REP. 83-84 (1983). See infra part III.B.
43. Interview with Dennis Mullins, Office of Legal Policy, Department of Justice, in
Washington, D.C. (Oct. 7, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Mullins Interview].
44. A. NEFF, supra note 1, at 32.
45. Exec. Order No. 11,972, 3 C.F.R. 96 (1977), noted in 28 U.S.C. § 44 at 6 (Supp. 1981).
The order was later superseded by Exec. Order No. 12,059, 3 C.F.R. 180 (1978), noted in 28
U.S.C. § 44 at 6 (Supp. 1981). The latter listed the following standards in evaluating appli-
cants: (1) membership in good standing in at least one state bar or the District of Columbia
bar; (2) a reputation for integrity and good character; (3) sound health; (4) a demonstrated
commitment to equal justice under law; (5) a demeanor, character, and personality indicating
judicial temperament. Commissions were allowed to consider the "training, experience, or
expertise" of an applicant in order to meet "a perceived need of the court." The commissions
were "encouraged to make special efforts to seek out and identify well-qualified women and
members of minority groups as potential nominees." Supplemental instructions were also
issued and suggested that candidates demonstrate legal experience in two out of five areas:
(1) substantial appellate experience as a lawyer or judge; (2) substantial trial court experience
as a lawyer or judge; (3) mastery of federal law through teaching experience or professional
association; (4) substantial legal writing on subjects dealing with federal law; (5) substantial




from all states contained in each circuit.4 6 The commissions, however,
were instructed to limit a particular search to candidates from a desig-
nated state. An executive order encouraging the use of panels for the
district courts was issued after the passage of the Omnibus Judgeship
Act of 1978 created 152 new federal court positions.4 7 Senators from
thirty states, including six states with two Republican senators, followed
the President's call and created panels. 48 After the names of candidates
were received from a panel or from a senator, the Department of Justice
sought additional review by sending the names not only to the ABA and
FBI but also to the National Bar Association 49 and the Federation of
Women Lawyers. The Department of Justice also consulted senators on
circuit court candidates received from the President's nominating
panels. 50 For the district court nominees, Carter directed the Attorney
General to verify that the senatorial selection process was "fair and rea-
sonable. '5 ' The Department of Justice then made its recommendations
to the President. Initially, Attorney General Bell presented these recom-
mendations to the President directly. After some disagreement, Bell al-
lowed these recommendations to be reviewed by White House aides
before he presented them to President Carter.52
The Reagan administration declined to continue the circuit court
panels. 53 Instead, it promised to set up procedures that would allow
recommendations to come from several sources, including senators rep-
resenting states in the circuit. 54 As in pre-Carter administrations, dis-
ment of Justice, Supplemental Instructions § B.4 (Oct. 2, 1978), reprinted in L. BERKSON & S.
CARBON, supra note 1, at 221, 223. An earlier standard stating that a "person who .has less
than 15 years of legal experience ... should be considered only in unusual circumstances and
if especially meritorious" was modified. Representatives of women and minority groups ob-
jected to the provision since few women or minority group members entered the legal profes-
sion until recent times. The earlier instructions are given in Department of Justice,
Supplemental Instructions § B.4, B.7 (Apr. 22, 1977), reprintedtn L. BERKSON & S. CARBON,
supra note 1, at 217, 219.
46. The geographically large Fifth and Ninth Circuits were divided into two panels. A
separate panel recommended candidates for District of Columbia district and circuit court
positions. Exec. Order No. 12,059, supra note 45.
47. Exec. Order No. 12,097,3 C.F.R. 254 (1978), repinted in 28 U.S.C. § 133 at 17 (Supp.
1981), provided criteria similar to those for circuit court positions but added that the nominee
should have the ability and willingness to manage complicated pre-trial and trial proceed-
ings. The President appointed his own panel for district judgeships in Puerto Rico. Exec.
Order No. 12,084, 3 C.F.R. 228 (1978), noted in 28 U.S.C. § 133 at 17 (Supp. 1981).
48. A. NEFF, supra note 1, at 54-56. See infa part II.A.
49. Ini'tial Hearing, supra note 9, at 15.
50. Telephone interview with Michael Egan, Associate Attorney General under President
Carter (Oct. 19, 1982).
51. Exec. Order No. 12,097, supra note 47.
52. G. BELL & R. OSTROW, supra note 37, at 40-42.
53. Exec. Order No. 12,305, 3 C.F.R. 150 (1981), repnintedt). 5 U.S.C. § 14 app. at 397-98
(Supp. 1981).
54. Department of Justice, Judicial Selection Procedures, supra note 2.
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trict court nominations are initiated by home-state senators of the
President's party or, if there is no such senator, by the state's governor,
party leadership, or members of the congressional delegation. A Depart-
ment of Justice memorandum urged that senators send three to five
names per vacancy.55 Once recommendations are compiled for both dis-
trict and circuit court nominations, the Office of Legal Policy of the
Department of Justice reviews them and sends evaluations to a "Depart-
ment of Justice Judicial Selection Working Group" chaired by the At-
torney General. 56 That committee sends its recommendations to a
White House group chaired by White House Counsel Fred Fielding.
5 7
The panel makes a tentative choice and sends the name to the American
Bar Association. 58 DOJ officials make preliminary inquiries before
sending the name to the FBI for a full field investigation. After all in-
vestigations are complete, the White House committee makes its final
recommendation to the President that the person be nominated. Should
any problems develop, the process returns to the Department of
Justice. 59
II. Senatorial Responses to Presidential Initiatives in Judicial Selection
Although senatorial courtesy has been a strong force throughout the
nomination process under both the Carter and Reagan administrations,
the administrations have adopted different frameworks for dealing with
the Senate's involvement. While Carter stressed the use of panels at
both the district and circuit levels, Reagan abolished the circuit panels
and placed less emphasis on the use of panels for district court positions.
This part of the inquiry examines how senators responded to these
frameworks and what recommendation procedures were actually em-
ployed in judicial selection. Specifically, this inquiry looks at three fac-
tors: (1) the use of nominating panels in selecting district court
nominees, (2) roles of senators and executive branch officials in selecting
circuit court judges, and (3) changes in senatorial courtesy and the blue
slip custom.
55. Id
56. Mullins Interview, supra note 43.
57. Cohodas, A Vacancy on Supreme Court Spotlights Slow Reagan Pace in Naming FederalJudges,
39 CoNG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1185, 1186 (1981).
58. The National Bar Association and the Federation of Women Lawyers do not receive
the names of candidates prior to nomination. The ABA, however, does consult with these
groups in its investigation.




A. Use of Panels in Recommending Candidates for District Court
Appointments
The panels were the frontispiece of the Carter reforms. Early in his
presidency Carter wrote each Democratic senator a handwritten letter
urging the establishment of the panels. He took the unprecedented step
of taking recommendations from states with two Republican senators if
they established a panel. Thirty states responded favorably, 6° and over
66% of all Carter district court nominees in 1979 and 1980 came from
states employing panels (Table I1-1).6 1
TABLE II- 1
DISTRICT COURT NOMINEES BY RECOMMENDATION PROCESS
CARTER AND REAGAN ADMINISTRATIONS
1979-82
Carter Administration Reagan Administration






Chart covers district court nominees from January 1, 1979 to November
15, 1982.
60. A. NEFF, supra note 1, at 53. The New Hampshire panel did not operate during the
96th Congress.
61. Table 11-1 is for all nominees sent to the Senate for confirmation between January 1,
1979 and November 15, 1982. The set of nominees consisted of all those listed by the ABA
Standing Committee on the Judiciary who were confirmed in 1979 and 1980 or who were not
confirmed at the end of Carter's presidency. For those nominated after the end of the Neff
study (February 20, 1980), it was assumed that all states with "permanent" panel charters
retained panels for all nominees in the remainder of the 96th Congress. For all those operat-
ing on an "ad hoc" basis, the state's retention of the panels was verified by Senate hearings or
interviews with Senate aides. States which had not used panels for previous nominees were
asumed not to have used them for the final group of nominees in the 96th Congress.
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TABLE 11-2
STATES EMPLOYING PANELS DURING THE CARTER
ADMINISTRATION
1979-80

















New Jersey D,D 4
New Mexico R,R 1





South Carolina D 4






District of Columbia ** 3
Puerto Rico ** 4
TOTALS: 10 D 112







STATES NOT EMPLOYING PANELS DURING THE CARTER
ADMINISTRATION
1979-80










New Hampshire*** R,R 1
North Carolina D,R 4
Texas D,R 17
West Virginia D,D 2
TOTALS: 4 D,D
13 States 8 D,R 56
1 R,R
* Vice President Mondale also selected panelists.
** -Presidentially appointed panel.
** Panel only operated for nominees in 1977 and 1978.
D - Democrat R - Republican I - Independent
Sources: A. NEFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE NOMINATING
COMMISSIONS: THEIR MEMBERS, PROCEDURES, AND CANDIDATES 54-56
(1981). "Number of Nominees" was compiled from information provided
by the ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary.
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TABLE IH-3
STATES EMPLOYING PANELS DURING THE REAGAN AD-
MINISTRATION
1981-82












New York R,D 5
Oklahoma R 1
Pennsylvania R,R 3
South Dakota R,R 1
Wisconsin R,D 1
TOTALS:








STATES NOT EMPLOYING PANELS DURING THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION









North Carolina RR 2
Ohio DD** 3
Rhode Island R,D 1




District of Columbia 2
Puerto Rico 2
TOTALS:




* - Extensive bar screening process. Committees solicit and evaluate candidates,
but do not name specific persons.
** -Where there is no Republican senator, candidates have generally been
recommended by the Republican congressional delegation, governor, or state
party leadership.
D - Democrat R - Republican I - Independent
Although one might have expected a sharp decline in the use of
panels for district court nominees under Reagan, this has not been the
case. Instead, many senators have continued to use the panels in mak-
ing recommendations for district court vacancies. Of the thirty states
that filled judicial vacancies by November 15, 1982, half employed
panel processes62 (Table 11-3). States employing panels accounted for
62. In order to determine which senators were using the panels during the Reagan admin-
istration, letters were sent to all Republican senators in states which had a district court
vacancy filled between January 20, 1981 and November 15, 1982. Where there was no Re-
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55.6% of all Reagan district court nominees during this period.
The continued use of the panels is not as surprising when one exam-
ines the motivations of senators in establishing panels under Carter.
Some senators, especially those with seniority, jealously guarded their
prerogatives and resented Carter's intrusions. 63 Other senators em-
braced the panel idea, but their reasons for doing so were not always
identical to the administration's. 64 A study by Dr. Elliot Slotnick of The
Ohio State University explored senatorial motivations in electing to use
advisory panels and concluded: "On the surface it appears that the
President brought about great change with his recommendation [to use
panels]. . . . In reality, however, consideration of the operation of the
panels demonstrates that these processes were often personalized efforts
elected for instrumental purposes unrelated to the President's
initiative. 65
Senators may have one or several of a variety of motivations in estab-
lishing a formal recommendation procedure. Public commissions are
considered "good politics" 66 and create public support for a senator and
his role in judicial selection. A panel enlists more public participation in
judicial selection and can create a broader pool of applicants. 67 Panels
are also used to share power between senators-either between those of
the same party68 or those of different parties. (Under both administra-
tions, for instance, New York's senators have operated their own individ-
ual panels with the "out-party" senator's panel making
publican Senator, letters were sent to the two Democratic senators. These letters were fol-
lowed up by telephone inquiries.
Two of the ten states sponsoring panels with only one Republican senator included the
Democratic senator in creating the commission. In the other eight states, the senatorial re-
sponses either explicitly stated that they were the sole sponsors of the system or made no
mention of participation by the Democratic senator.
63. Slotnick, Reforms in Judicial Selection (pt. 1), supra note 33, at 66.
64. Senator Pat McCarren said of judicial appointments, "It's the lousiest duty in the
world because what you end up with is 100 enemies and one ingrate." lnitial Hearing, supra
note 9, at 25 (Sen. Paul Laxalt quoting Sen. McCarren).
65. Slotnick, Judicial Selection Reform and Advice and Consent: Implications for Insti-
tutional Change 10 (1982) (unpublished) (on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review).
66. See Alan M. Dershowitz, quoted in Schellhardt, Reshaping the FederalJudiciary, Wall St.
J., Feb. 23, 1978, at 26, col. 4. See generally Slotnick, Judicial Selection Reform and Advice
and Consent, supra note 65, at 11. One Senate aide told Slotnick: "We chose to use a com-
mission in order to make it appear as if the public were more involved. The public likes the
commission idea and, ironically, they hope that it will produce the same quality of judges we
have in - now." Slotnick, Reforms in Judicial Selection (pt. 2), supra note 33, at 123-26.
67. Forty-three percent of the circuit court candidates surveyed by Berkson and Carbon
believed that they would not have been considered for the position if the commission had not
been created. L. BERKSON & S. CARBON, supra note 1, at 138.
68. Of the seven states with two Republican senators in which a vacancy has been filled,
four have elected to use a panel system. Indiana, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and South Da-




recommendations for every fourth vacancy.69 ) Senators Kasten (Repub-
lican) and Proxmire (Democrat) of Wisconsin set up a panel in which
both senators chose panelists. 70 The administrative convenience in leav-
ing the decision to a panel should also not be overlooked. 7' Finally,
senators support panels because they feel that panels improve the quali-
ty of the nominees. 72
Another possible explanation for the continued use of panels is that
Republican senators who adopted panels under Carter chose to retain
them under Reagan. Under the Carter administration, six states with
two Republican senators had elected to use the panels. Of these six,
three have had judicial vacancies filled under the Reagan administra-
tion. Two of these (Minnesota and Pennsylvania) retained the panel
system under Reagan, while the third, Kansas, chose a nominee that
had been previously recommended by the panel system. 73 Senator
Heinz of Pennsylvania explained his faith in the commission system:
"Indeed, I am very proud of the results of our judicial nominating com-
mission. It was a commission that Senator Schweiker and I established
five years ago. . . . And people said then, 'Well, I guess it is to be
expected that Republican Senators would have a procedure like this if
there is a Democratic President, but they certainly would never main-
tain if if there was a Republican President.' -74
For district court nominations, President Reagan has generally acted
only on recommendations from Republican senators or their panels.
Where there has been no Republican senator, the President has turned
69. A. NEFF, supra note 1, at 57. A somewhat similar relationship existed between Sena-
tors Cranston and Hayakawa during the Carter administration, although only one panel was
created. Id at 132.
70. Confomaton of FederalJudges. Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciay, Part 2,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 139 (1981) (statement of Sen. William Proxmire) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings, 97th Cong., Part 2].
71. Tydings, Merit Selectionfor DistrictJudges, 61 JUDICATURE 112, 114 (1977). Senators
may well have found that they have to devote less of their own time to district judge selection
by delegating part of the duties to a panel. Of the five states with the greatest number of
judgeships, four have used panels under both administrations: California, New York, Florida,
and Pennsylvania (leaving only Texas).
72. Slotnick, Refonnrs inJudicial Selection (pt. 2), supra note 33, at 124. Thirty-three percent
of Slotnick's respondents (senators or their aides) reported that they supported the commis-
sion in order to open up or depoliticize the recruitment process. Fifteen percent gave political
reasons, such as a campaign pledge. Fourteen percent pointed to Carter's mandate to estab-
lish the panels. Another 14% suggested public popularity, while 6% said that the panels en-
hance the senatorial advice and consent function.
73. Vice President Walter Mondale selected half of the Minnesota Panel during the
Carter administration. Senators Boschwitz and Durenberger now select all of the commission
members. Letter from Sen. David Durenberger to Gary Fowler (Nov. 22, 1982) (on file with
the Yale Law & Poliy Review).
74. Confwmation of FederalJudges: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judicary, Part 3,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 126 (1982).
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to the state congressional delegation, prominent officeholders in the
state, or the state party leadership. A possible exception is Kentucky,
where the President nominated a person recommended by the Kentucky
panel set up by Democratic Senators Huddleston and Ford. 75 In Ha-
waii, however, the President rejected candidates recommended by the
commission established by Democratic Senators Inouye and Matsunaga
and instead chose a person selected by the state party leadership.
76
The selection system in Illinois deserves further explanation. Senator
Percy has not appointed his own panel but instead has used a series of
bar panels to solicit and evaluate candidates. These panels review can-
didates suggested by the senator and other sources. Unlike other panel
systems, however, they do not eliminate candidates from consideration
or compile a list of preferred candidates. Instead, their evaluations on
all applicants are sent back to the senator. The senator then selects the
final list of candidates to be sent to the President.
77
Both Carter and Reagan have encouraged senators to send more than
one name per vacancy.7 8 Apparently not wishing to push their luck, all
six of the Republican-sponsored commissions under Carter set up "blind
commissions" which forwarded the names of all those recommended by
the panels directly to the President. Of the remaining twenty-four
panels (sponsored at least in part by Democrats), only seven followed
the President's direction and submitted more than one name.79 In the
Reagan administration, five of the fifteen states with panels reported
sending more than one name per vacancy, but two of these stated that
they made their preferences known to the Justice Department. Four
states reported recommending only one name per vacancy while the
practice of the remaining six was not determined.8 0 Republican sena-
75. Letter from Sen. Wendell Ford to Gary Fowler (Nov. 18, 1982) (on file with the Yale
Law & Poliy Review).
76. Letter from Sen. Spark Matsunaga to Gary Fowler (Nov. 26, 1982) (on file with the
Yale Law & Policy Review). Reagan has also nominated persons recommended by Senator
Moynihan's panel. Confirmation of FederalJudges: Hearngs Before the Senate Committee on theJud-
czay, Part 1, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 42-43 (1981).
77. Letter from Kathleen Lydon, Press Secretary to Sen. Charles H. Percy, to Gary Fowl-
er (Nov. 17, 1982) (on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review). Although representatives of
Alabama Senator Jeremiah Denton stated that applicants were screened by a bar committee,
the committee did not have the responsibility of soliciting applicants.
78. Department of Justice, Supplemental Guidelines for U.S. District Judge Nominating
Commission § II.F.4, repnntedin A. NEFF, supra note 1, at 197; Department of Justice, Judicial
Selection Procedures, supra note 2. Thirteen of the thirty states employing panels under
Carter left the final selection to the President. A. NEFF, supra note 1, at 63.
79. A. NEFF, szpra note 1, at 60-63.
80. Senators from Georgia and Illinois reported sending lists of candidates to the Depart-
ment of Justice, but each reported that they singled out a preferred candidate. Senators from
Indiana, Kentucky, and Minnesota sent lists of candidates directly to the Justice Department.




tors have expressed reluctance to relinquish any further control over the
recommendation process. Senator Percy of Illinois referred to the mat-
ter as "an unsettled issue" and said that, "If we find a great deal of
dissatisfaction with the [President's] process, if we find it does diffuse
and undercut the responsibilities that senators have always had, I think
we'd have to sit down and work it out with them."8'
Even Carter administration officials recognized that problems could
develop in the panel system.8 2 One notable example under the Carter
administration occurred in Virginia. Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., an In-
dependent, set up two panels for the state's two judicial districts. Each
panel consisted of nine members and included one black and one wo-
man. The Carter administration, however, objected when the panels
recommended ten white males. Byrd refused to approve any nominee
not selected by the panels, claiming that he was defending "merit selec-
tion" by doing "precisely what the President, in a hand-written letter,
asked me to do."83 Carter nominated three candidates from the list, but
also included James A. Sheffield, a black state judge in Virginia. Byrd
returned all four blue slips, approving the three nominees named by the
panels but objecting to Sheffield. 4 Two of the three recommended by
Byrd were later confirmed. Questions regarding Judge Sheffield's tax
returns delayed his nomination, and he later withdrew his name from
consideration. 5
While the Virginia example reveals one way in which a serious im-
passe can develop between a President and a senator, there have been
other difficulties as well. For instance, panel voting procedures were
challenged in Wisconsin. The Wisconsin panel, created by Senator Kas-
send only one name per vacancy. The policy of California, Maryland, New York, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin was not determined.
81. Chicago Lawyer, Sept. 1981, at 6, col. 1.
82. Attorney General Griffin Bell told the Senate Judiciary Committee: "I do not think
[the panels] ought to be required by law. We have had some trouble with the commissions.
They are not accountable to anyone. You have to be certain that they are following fair
procedures themselves, that they are not manipulating lists so that they get someone on the
list that is going to be appointed because there is one strong person and four weak people, for
example." Initial Hearing, supra note 9, at 20.
83. Samuels & Goodman, Byrd's Ploy, Adlai's Pals, NATION, Jan. 20, 1979, at 46-49.
84. Selection and Confzornation of FederalJudges. Hearings Before the Senate Committee on theJudici
ary, Part 8, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980) (statement of Sen. Harry F. Byrd, Jr.) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings, 96th Cong., Part 8].
85. Wash. Post, July 15, 1981, at BI, col. 1, B4, col. 1. The delay in the Virginia nomina-
tions allowed the Reagan administration to fill two of the vacancies since neither Sheffield
nor James P. Jones was confirmed. Nevertheless, Carter may have received indirect benefit
from the situation by showing that he was willing to combat senatorial courtesy. A. NEFF,
supra note 1, at 115. Attorney General Bell stated that he would return a list of white male
candidates where the administration felt that qualified women and minorities were being
overlooked. Initial Hearing, supra note 9, at 17.
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ten under the Reagan administration, consisted of fifteen members: the
Dean of the University of Wisconsin Law School, seven members ap-
pointed by Senator Kasten, three by Senator Proxmire, and four by the
state bar association. The non-Kasten appointees supported two candi-
dates, the only ones to receive a majority. The seven Kasten appointees
supported John C. Shabaz. When it was discovered that only two can-
didates had received a majority, the panel voted eight to six to include
the next three candidates, which then included Shabaz with the seven
votes from the Kasten appointees. When Shabaz was nominated, Sena-
tor Proxmire returned the blue slip stating his opposition. At Shabaz's
confirmation hearing, Proxmire cited a minority report issued by seven
of the commission members which charged a pre-arrangement among
the Kasten appointees: "[They] succeeded in turning the result of the
Commission's designation into a political spoils system benefitting their
pre-selected candidate, John Shabaz. This is not to say that Senator
Kasten had anything to do with these actions .... "86 Mr. Shabaz's
nomination encountered no further resistance, and he was confirmed.
Although panels have been used under both administrations, it
should be emphasized that the Carter and Reagan approaches to dis-
trict judge selection are not identical. Carter not only actively pushed
for the panel systems but also instructed the Department of Justice to
ensure that all recommendation processes were "fair and reasonable. '8 7
Senators may have had their own motivations for adopting panel sys-
tems, but it was the Carter administration that set the standard for judi-
cial recruitment through its executive orders and suggested guidelines.
Perhaps more importantly, Carter changed the "language" of judicial
selection;8a commissions became the norm rather than the exception.
To some degree, the Carter administration found it necessary to combat
the traditional system of selection in order to promote the nomination of
women and minority group candidates. This could be done best by
exerting pressures on the first stage of the judicial selection process. The
Reagan administration has left more discretion to senators in the types
of recruitment procedures they may choose to employ. It performs a
function more akin to that of pre-Carter administrations in reviewing
and screening candidates recommended by senators.
B. Senatorial Roles in Circuit Court Recommendation Procedures
"When it comes to making appointments to circuit courts, the bal-
86. Heanngs, 97th Cong., Part 2, supra note 70, at 167-68.
87. Exec. Order No. 12,097, supra note 47.
88. A. NEFF, supra note 1, at 150.
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ance of power shifts markedly to favor decision-making by the presi-
dent's men," observed Professor Harold Chase eleven years ago.8 9 The
regional character of circuit court positions allows executive branch offi-
cials some freedom from the prerogatives of any one state's senator.9°
Senators cannot argue that they may be held responsible at the polls by
the voters in the court's jurisdiction since circuits cover more than one
state. Consequently, it is understandable that Judiciary Chair Eastland,
who was considered a guardian of senatorial prerogatives, assented to
the presidentially-appointed commissions established in 1977.
The panels provided an additional benefit to executive branch offi-
cials by clearly separating circuit court procedures from those for the
district courts. This is not to say that senators were removed from the
pre-nomination process entirely. A study by Slotnick found senatorial
participation in the circuit court recommendation and screening process
under Carter. While 28% of the senators surveyed claimed a role in
helping the President to make a final choice among candidates, a size-
able minority (3 1%) even claimed some role in choosing the panelists.9 1
Once recommendations were received from the panels, Department of
Justice officials consulted with a candidate's home-state Democratic sen-
ators before nomination.9 2 Despite senatorial participation in the pre-
nomination process, the President still had a significant advantage in
creating a system in which recommendation procedures began in the
executive branch through a presidentially-appointed mechanism.
When the panels were instituted under Carter, some senators opposed
the greater amount of presidential influence in the circuit court recom-
mendation process.9 3 The most visible conflict occurred in North Caro-
lina where both Senators Jesse Helms and Robert Morgan expressed
discontent with the commission system from the beginning. The Fourth
Circuit panel was criticized for asking questions regarding the candi-
date's views on abortion, women's rights, and "state sovereignty.
94
Senator Helms objected even more strongly when the panel recom-
mended United States District Judge James McMillan, who had written
the lower court decision ordering mandatory desegregation in Swann v.
89. H. CHASE, supra note 5, at 43.
90. Id
91. Slotnick, Reforms injudiial Selection (pt. 2), supra note 33, at 131.
92. Telephone interview with Michael Egan, supra note 50.
93. Slotnick, Federal Appellate Judge Selection, supra note 1, at 293.
94. See generally Fish, QuestioningJudicial Candidates: What Can Merit Selectors Ask?, 62 JUDI-
CATURE 8, 10, 11 (1978); Fish, Merit Selection and Politics: Choosing a Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635 (1979).
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Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education .95 The panel also recommended
Julius Chambers, who was the attorney for the plaintiffs in Swann. At-
torney General Bell reportedly supported McMillan for the position. 96
Ultimately, the Carter administration decided to nominate a compro-
mise candidate recommended by the panel, Dickson Phillips of the Uni-
versity of North Carolina Law School. 97
Senators intervened not only by objecting to the selection of a candi-
date but also by pushing one of their own choices. Senator Edward M.
Kennedy secured the nomination of Harvard Law Professor Stephen
Breyer, who had served Kennedy as Chief Counsel of the Senate Judici-
ary Committee. The Breyer nomination came after a long impasse had
developed between Carter and Kennedy on the selection of Archibald
Cox for the position. Although Cox was recommended by the First Cir-
cuit panel, the Carter administration opposed Cox because of his ad-
vanced age. The qualifications of both Cox and Breyer were extremely
high, but as one scholar ofjudicial selection politics posited, the commis-
sion's recommendation of Breyer acted only as a "charade" for a selec-
tion decision reached independently by the President and Senator
Kennedy.98 Breyer's nomination encountered additional resistance at
his confirmation hearing from Senator John Chafee of Rhode Island,
who felt his state deserved representation on the First Circuit.99 Later,
Senator Morgan of North Carolina attempted to filibuster the nomina-
tion but was overcome by bipartisan support led by Kennedy and Sena-
tor J. Strom Turmond, the Ranking Minority Member of the Senate
Judiciary Committee. 100
The Carter administration restricted a panel's search to one state in
making its recommendations. Although this restriction tended to per-
petuate the idea that a circuit seat "belonged" to one state and opened
an opportunity to invoke senatorial courtesy, the Carter administration
95. 311 F. Supp. 265 (W.D.N.C.),affdinpart, vacated in part, 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970),
afjld in part, 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (affirming district court opinion).
96. Fish, Merit Selection and Politics, supra note 94, at 652.
97. President Carter received criticism for the administration's handling of the nomina-
tion, even though all agreed that Dickson Phillips was an outstanding nominee. Levinson,
How Not to Pck a Judge, NATION, Sept. 23, 1978, at 262-63.
98. Goldman, The Battle over the First Circuit Vacancy, 64 JUDICATURE 354 (1981).
99. Heangs, 96th Cong., Part 8, supra note 84, at 196-201. Senator Chafee later voted in
favor of the nomination. 126 CONG. REc. S15877 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1980).
100. Senator Morgan denied that he opposed Breyer's nomination because of Breyer's
role as Chief Counsel of the Judiciary Committee in the defeat of Morgan's choice, Charles
Winberry, for a judgeship in North Carolina. See infra at note 113. Morgan instead argued
that it was unfair to forward Breyer's nomination when other persons nominated before
Breyer were still being held in committee. One of those nominees, S. Gerald Arnold, was




felt any other system wpuld be unworkable.101
Although the Reagan administration does not maintain a separate
system for circuit court nominations, officials have tried to maintain the
distinction between district and circuit court recommendation proce-
dures. The administration wishes to give weight to senatorial recom-
mendations but does not wish to perpetuate-or revive-the idea that a
senator has a special prerogative to one seat.102 Jonathan Rose of the
Office of Legal Policy of the Department of Justice said, "Our pride in
our circuit court appointments in large part is due to the fact that we've
been able to get by the senatorial courtesy system."10 3 Rose cited four
nominations: Robert Bork, Antonin Scalia, Ralph Winter, and Richard
Posner. Two of these nominations-Bork and Scalia-were for the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and would be considered
to be outside any senatorial prerogative. Executive branch officials also
initiated the nomination of Winter for the Second Circuit and Posner
for the Seventh Circuit. Word of Winter's candidacy reached the press
before Connecticut Senator Lowell Weicker had made any recommen-
dations,1 0 4 while Reagan's nomination of Posner came after Senator
Percy had publicly endorsed three other candidates. 0 5 In both cases,
the senators endorsed the nomination, although Percy recommended his
three candidates for another Seventh Circuit vacancy. 106 The panels set
up by Republican senators for district court nominations generally do
not consider circuit court recommendations.10 7
In response to an inquiry to senators in states which had filled judicial
vacancies during the Reagan administration, 0 8 senators for seven of the
101. Slotnick, Federal Appellate Judge Seklction, supra note 1, at 292, 296.
102. Wash. Post, Sept. 10, 1982, at A17, col. 1.
103. Interview with Jonathan Rose, Office of Legal Policy, Department of Justice, Legal
Times, Nov. 8, 1982, at 6, col. 1.
104. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1981, at 1, col. 4. Senator Lowell Weicker's office affirmed that
although Senator Weicker fully supported the nomination, Judge Winter had not been ini-
tially recommended by the senator.
105. Sen. Charles H. Percy, Press Release (July 17, 1981) (copy on file with the Yale Law
& Polic Review).
106. Letter from Kathleen Lydon, supra note 77.
107. Most panels are limited to making recommendations for U.S. District Court Judges,
U.S. Attorneys, and federal Marshals. See, e.g., Sen. Richard G. Lugar, Press Release (Dec. 5,
1980) (on file with the Yale Law &PoAls Review). The charters for the comissions in Hawaii
and Kentucky state that they will consider applicants for circuit court positions. Senator
Percy's system also operates for circuit court positions. Letter from Kathleen Lydon, supra
note 77; letter from Sen. Spark Matsunaga, supra note 76; letter from Sen. Wendell Ford,
supra note 75.
108. Letters were sent to all Republican senators in states which had a vacancy filled
between January 20, 1981 and November 15, 1982. The inquiry asked:
(1) Did you make any recommendations to the President for vacancies on the circuit
court of appeals?
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thirteen states reported that they had made recommendations for appel-
late court vacancies. 0 9 Only one of these (Illinois) replied that the per-
son nominated was not among those recommended. Four states did not
respond." 0 Of the remaining two, one was Connecticut (Judge Winter's
nomination) and the other Missouri, where the administration nomi-
nated John R. Gibson. Judge Gibson had been recommended to his
district court position only one year before by Senator John Danforth's
screening panel.
The most significant difference between the Carter and Reagan cir-
cuit court selection systems is that senators who wish to push a particu-
lar candidate under Reagan do not have to gain the concurrence of a
presidentially-appointed recommendation process. Senators under the
Reagan administration, however, do have to gain the acceptance of the
Department of Justice and White House officials. These officials have
shown themselves willing to reject a senator's recommendation and
nominate their own candidate when they feel that their person better
meets the administration's standards for both quality and philosophy.
Even though senators are more directly involved in the initial recom-
mendation process than they were under Carter, the Reagan adminis-
tration continues to set the terms of the circuit court selection process to
a much greater degree than for district court nominations. In Illinois,
Reagan's policy conflicted with the recommendations of Senator Percy
in the nomination of Judge Posner. Percy again recommended District
Judge Joel Flaum for a position on the Seventh Circuit, although the
administration was reported to be leaning toward the nomination of
University of Chicago law professor Frank Easterbrook."' Nominees to
the circuit courts must satisfy Reagan administration criteria to a
greater degree than nominees to the district courts. Even among those
circuit courts nominees recommended by senators, however, all but one
had established a record through judicial experience that Reagan offi-
cials could use in determining the nominee's philosophy and qualifica-
tions. Thus, the arena of circuit court nominations is one that may be
(4) Was the person ultimately nominated among those that you recommended?
Where there was no Republican senator, modified inquiries were sent to the Democratic
senators.
109. Illinois, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Wiscon-
sin. Other authors, however, have observed that the "Department [of Justice] prefers that its
suggestions become the recommendations of senators." L. BERKSON & S. CARBON, supra note
1, at 14.
110. Indiana, Iowa, New York, and Ohio.
111. American Lawyer, Jan. 1983, at 18, col. 3; Chicago Lawyer, Feb. 1983, at 5, col. 1.




described as one of consensus and compromise, rather than domination
by one branch over the other.
C. The Senate Judtz'ag Committee and Senatorial Courtesy
As a formal matter, the Senate Judiciary Committee's function is to
evaluate judicial nominees through the confirmation process and to rec-
ommend action to the full Senate.1 2 Informally, however, the activities
of the committee influence the initial recommendation and nomination
procedures of the selection process. Its investigations and public hear-
ings reinforce the screening functions of the Department of Justice and
the American Bar Association. The committee's position on controver-
sial issues in judicial selection influence the actions of earlier partici-
pants who wish to avoid the public embarrassment of problems exposed
at confirmation. Finally, the Judiciary Committee for many years acted
as the protector of senatorial courtesy through its blue slip procedure.
The blue slip worked best not when it provoked an impasse, but when it
led executive branch officials to honor senatorial prerogatives in recom-
mending candidates. In these areas of investigating nominees, making
policy, and enforcing senatorial courtesy, Senator Edward M. Kennedy,
as chairman, changed the committee's role.
Kennedy reformed the committee's investigation procedures over
those employed by his predecessor, Senator James Eastland. He created
an investigative staff to free the committee from sole reliance on FBI
reports and investigations. The committee developed an extensive ques-
tionnaire, available in most parts to the public."t 3 Upon replacing Sen-
ator Kennedy as chairman in 1981, Senator Strom Thurmond of South
Carolina continued the use of an investigative staff and adopted a ques-
tionnaire similar to that employed under Kennedy. As under Kennedy,
112. F. RIDDICK, SENATE PROCEDURE, Rule XXXVIII, Sen. Doc. No. 93-21, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 553 (1973).
113. InitialHearing, supra note 9, at 4. Kennedy said, "Appointments to these [lower fed-
eral] courts . . . have been of special interest to individual Senators because Federal judicial
districts are drawn within the boundaries of individual States. The processing of lower court
nominations has been likened to a rubberstamp by some critics who believe that the failure of
the Senate as a whole to scrutinize nominations disserves the public and demeans the bench."
Id at 3.
The committee's action in reporting unfavorably the nomination of Charles Winberry for
the position of District Judge of the Eastern District of North Carolina may have represented
a turning point in the committee's investigative role. The committee voted against the nomi-
nation "because it was not satisfied by [his] answers to allegations that he had acted improp-
erly as counsel in a criminal case" in procuring favors for a client. The vote was the first
formal rejection of a nominee for a district court position in forty-two years. It was especially
noteworthy given the strong support for the nomination by North Carolina Senator Robert
Morgan. A. NEFF, supra note 1, at 43. See genera4o Selection and Confrmation of FederalJudges:
Hearings Before the Senate Commnttee on tteJudiay, 96th Cong. 1st & 2d Sess., pt. 4 at 604-32, pt.
5 at 485-604 (1979-1980).
325
Yale Law & Policy Review
the chairman, ranking minority member, and selected staff personnel
have access to the FBI files.' 14
Committee policy concerns are often reflected at confirmation hear-
ings. Senators often use questioning at these hearings to impress their
viewpoints upon nominees before they grant them their lifetime ap-
pointments. Senator Kennedy was often concerned with a nominee's
views on civil rights. 115 Senator Thurmond and other Senate Republi-
cans have asked over 60% of all nominees their positions on issues re-
garding "judicial restraint" and the courts' role in relation to the other
branches of government and to the states.116
The most controversial matter under the Kennedy chairmanship was
the "club issue." The controversy concerned the membership of nomi-
nees in private clubs whose membership policies excluded or appeared
to exclude persons on the basis of race or sex. The issue's intensity grew
during the confirmation hearing of Bailey Brown for a position on the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Brown refused to resign his mem-
bership in the University Club of Memphis, but told the committee
that,
The University Club has no black member, though I have seen black per-
sons eating there as guests. I understand there is nothing in the constitu-
tion or bylaws ruling out black members, though it is my opinion that
114. Senator Thurmond was steadfast that this access be maintained. Confirmation Hearing
on William French Smith, Nominee to be Attorney General" Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciay, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 60-61 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Smith Hearng].
115. For example, Kennedy's questionnaire asked all nominees: "In what specific ways
have you demonstrated a commitment to equal justice during your career?" STAFF OF SEN-
ATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., QUESTIONNAIRE TO JUDICIAL
NOMINEES § 111. 1, reprinted in Initial Hearing, supra note 9, at 130.
116. All hearings through March 31, 1982 were examined. All nominees answer the fol-
lowing question in the committee's questionnaire:
1. Please discuss your views on the following criticism involving "judicial activism."
The role of the Federal judiciary within the Federal government, and within society
generally, has become the subject of increasing controversy in recent years. It has be-
come the target of both popular and academic criticism that alleges that the judicial
branch has usurped many of the prerogatives of other branches and levels of govern-
ment. Some of the characteristics of this "judicial activism" have been said to include:
a. A tendency by the judiciary toward problem-solution rather than grievance-
resolution;
b. A tendency by the judiciary to employ the individual plaintiff as a vehicle for
the imposition of far-reaching orders extending to broad classes of individuals;
c. A tendency by the judiciary to impose broad, affirmative duties upon govern-
ments and society;
d. A tendency by the judiciary toward loosening jurisdictional requirements
such as standing and ripeness; and
e. A tendency by the judiciary to impose itself upon other institutions in the
manner of an administrator with continuing oversight responsibilities.
STAFF OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 97TH CONG., IST SESS., QUESTIONNAIRE




while no blacks may have ever applied, none would have been accepted. "1 7
Judge Brown emphasized that he believed the policy should be changed
but that he could do "more good for the cause by staying in" and pro-
moting the membership of blacks.' 18 Judge Brown eventually agreed to
suspend his membership until he determined the club's membership
policies. Kennedy, in turn, secured Senator Strom Thurmond's support
in co-signing a letter, stating: "In our view, it is inadvisable for a nomi-
nee for a federal judgeship to belong to a social club that engages in
invidious discrimination."'1 19 The Washington Post later reported that
"more than a dozen" nominees for federal judgeships resigned member-
ships in clubs whose policies were questionable.
20
Concern with the club issue has decreased since the Brown nomina-
tion. Although "endors[ing] the principle that it is inappropriate for a
judge to hold a membership in any organization that practices invidious
discrimination," the Judicial Conference of the United States moved
away from a more rigorous standard and declared that it "must ulti-
mately be determined by the conscience of the individual judge whether
membership in a particular organization is incompatible with the duties
of the judicial office.' 1 2 1 Thurmond's position is similar. He concurs
with his 1979 letter but states that the question should be left to the
judge or nominee.' 22  The issue surfaced again in the nomination of
District Judge Harry W. Wellford for a position on the Sixth Circuit.
Judge Wellford, whose nomination had run into opposition in 1976 be-
cause of his membership in the Memphis Country Club, avoided further
controversy by resigning it upon his renomination in 1982.123 The Judi-
ciary Committee has removed the club issue from public scrutiny even
further by moving its question regarding club membership from the
117. Selection and Confowation of Federal Judges.- Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, Part 2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 253 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Brown Hearing].
118. id
119. Letter from Sen. Edward Kennedy and Sen. J. Strom Thurmond to Judge Bailey
Brown (Sept. 11, 1979), reprinted in Brown Hearing, supra note 117, at 261.
120. Wash. Post, Sept. 23, 1979, at A13, col. 1, reprited in Brown Hearing, supra note 117, at
264-65. Most civil rights advocates were concerned particularly with the appearance of im-
propriety resulting from a judge deciding civil rights cases while belonging to such a club. To
many, such social clubs symbolized racial discrimination. Seegenrally SOUTHERN REGIONAL
COUNCIL, THE CRISIS OF CONSCIENCE: FEDERAL JUDGES IN SEGREGATED CLUBS, reprinted
in 125 CONG. REG. 26,019-21 (1979).
121. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 27 (1981), quoted in Bell, Prwate Clubs and
Pubic Judges." A Non-Substantive Debate about Symbols, 59 TEx. L. REV. 733, 740 n.45 (1981).
122. Interview with Robert Short, Senate Judiciary Committee, in Washington, D.C.
(Oct. 8, 1982).
123. Memphis Commercial-Appeal, June 30, 1982, at B 1, reprinted in Selection and Confimfa-
tion of FederalJudges: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on theJudiar, Part 4, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess., 162 (1982).
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public to the confidential section of the questionnaire.' 24
The Kennedy reform with the greatest potential for altering initial
recommendation procedures dealt with the blue slip. Saying that he
could not "discard cavalierly the tradition of senatorial courtesy, excep-
tion-riddled and outdated as it may be," Kennedy announced at the
committee's hearing in January, 1979, that he would continue to send
out blue slips. If a blue slip was not returned, however, "rather than
letting the nomination die I will place before the committee a motion to
determine whether it wishes to proceed to a hearing on the nomination
... .The committee, and ultimately the Senate, can work its will. '1 25
The new policy made it much more likely that the President could
nominate someone of his own choosing without facing the possibility of
the quiet blue slip veto. Senatorial courtesy could still be invoked, but
Kennedy's policy meant that the fight would be public. At the same
hearing, Attorney General Bell noted that Kennedy's change could
force a shift to the executive branch in judicial selection politics. More
importantly, the special advantage accorded senators who did not be-
long to the President's party would be gone. In response to a question
from Senator Thurmond as to whether the Department of Justice would
continue to "confer with both Senators before even submitting a nomi-
nation to the Senate," Bell candidly admitted, "[T]hat would get down
to whatever the Senate is going to do about the blue slip. . . . If there
were no blue slip procedure and we wanted to send a name in, we
would. I will have to say, frankly, we would."1 26
Nevertheless, the Carter Justice Department never felt secure enough
in the new position to test it. Associate Attorney General Michael Egan
said, "We never were quite sure what Kennedy would do [without a]
blue slip, and we didn't want to find out. ' 127 What action the Judiciary
Committee would have taken is uncertain. Results of a study by
Slotnick showed further ambivalence among senators during the Carter
administration. While 57% of the senators surveyed favored continu-
ance of the blue slip, only 32% favored its elimination or the Kennedy
reform. A majority (62%) seemed to lend qualified support to the Ken-
124. 37 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC 412 (1981). Attorney General Smith
was criticized for his failure to resign from two all-male clubs. Smith pointed out that both
clubs had minority members. Smith Hearing, supra note 114, at 22-24.
125. Initial Hranng, supra note 9, at 4.
126. Id at 23.
127. Interview with Michael Egan, supra note 50. Although the Virginia nominations
were held up partly because of Senator Byrd's opposition, the situation tested the Carter
administration's merit selection and affirmative action policies rather than Kennedy's blue
slip policy. Ultimately,. Senator Byrd returned the blue slips, stating his objections to the




nedy initiative by saying that "they would not defer as a matter of course
to their colleagues' attempts to block a nomination by withholding a
blue slip.' 28
Thurmond's earlier statements would lead to the expectation that he
would support the traditional use of the blue slip. His stated policy,
however, introduces even more ambiguity into the procedure:
I intend to follow the same general procedure on the blue slip process as
was followed by the previous chairman. If blue slips on a nomination are
not returned within a reasonable time, then I would not necessarily con-
sider that fact a bar to the nomination, but it would be a significant factor
which should be considered and taken into account prior to any hearing
on the nomination.' 29
Unlike the Kennedy statement, the Thurmond policy makes no mention
of a committee decision and leaves open the possibility that a blue slip
could be withheld and a nomination die without any public action. 30
Thurmond may wish to leave the issue open, rather than commit him-
self to a position that could bind him in an executive-senatorial confron-
tation. Thurmond's policy may have been tested in the nomination of
Sam Bell for a district judgeship in Ohio. Thurmond held a hearing on
Bell's nomination, even though Senator Howard Metzenbaum (Dem.-
Ohio) had not returned the blue slip.' 31 Under Thurmond, therefore,
withholding a blue slip will not always delay a hearing on the nomina-
tion. Thurmond's action indicates that the blue slip privilege may no
longer extend to a senator who does not belong to the President's party.
128. Slotnick, Reforms in Judicial Selection (pt. 1), supra note 33, at 70 (emphasis original).
The respondents included both Democratic and Republican senators.
129. Sen. J. Strom Thurmond, Blue Slip Policy (1981) (on file with the Yale Law &Policy
Review). At the 1979 hearing, Thurmond said, "I presume that the committee will honor the
blue-slip system that has worked so well in the past. This is not only a matter of senatorial
courtesy but has on many occasions provided insight on a nominee not otherwise presented."
Initial Hearng, supra note 9, at 5 (statement of Sen. Thurmond read by Sen. Laxalt). See also
Cohodas, How Reagan Will tck Judges Is Unclear, But Philosophy Will Play an Important Role, 39
CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 299, 303 (1981).
130. Compare Kennedy's statement: "If the blue slip is not returned within a reasonable
time..., I will place before the Committee a motion to determine whether it wishes to proceed
.(emphasis added) with Thurmond's statement: "If blue slips on a nomination are not
returned within a reasonable time, then I would not necessarily consider that fact a bar to the
nomination ..." (emphasis added). Compare text accompanying note 125 and note 129,
supra. The latter statement leaves open the possibility of unilateral action by the chairman
that would allow the nomination to die quietly.
131. Metzenbaum did not return the blue slip because he did not have sufficient time to
study the nomination. Nevertheless, Thurmond held the hearing and remarked only that the
senator did not make "any other attempts to prevent today's hearing." Confo'mation of Federal
Judges- Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Part 4, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 269
(1982). An aide to Senator Metzenbaum told the author that the blue slip was later returned.
See also, Goldman, Reagan's Judiial Appointments at Mid-Term: Shaping the Bench in His Own
Image, 66 JUDICATURE 334, 347 n. 15 (1983).
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In sum, home-state senators played a significant role in both the
Carter and Reagan administration recommendation procedures for dis-
trict and circuit courts. Although President Reagan has not placed as
much emphasis on senators' use of formal nominating panels, a majority
of the district court nominees selected under both administrations were
selected through panel processes. This suggests that panels have earned
a significant place in the judicial selection process for district court posi-
tions. For the circuit courts, Carter's use of a presidentially-appointed
nominating commission created a separate system from the district
courts in which recommendation procedures were conducted exclusively
through an executive branch mechanism. That advantage was lost to
the Reagan administration when it abolished the panels. Although sen-
ators therefore are more directly involved in the recommendation pro-
cess than under Carter, the Reagan administration has maintained a
prerogative to select its own nominees for circuit court positions.
Both Senators Kennedy and Thurmond as Chairmen of the Senate
Judiciary Committee have influenced the recommendation process
through their investigation procedures, policy positions, and blue slip
policies. While Thurmond has maintained Kennedy's innovations in in-
vestigation procedures, he has placed less emphasis on a nominee's club
memberships. Thurmond's blue slip policy differs from Kennedy's in
that it allows the possibility of unilateral action by the chairman in de-
ciding not to hold a hearing when a blue slip is withheld. Thurmond's
action in holding a hearing without a blue slip from Democratic Senator
Howard Metzenbaum, however, indicates that the blue slip policy no
longer automatically extends a special prerogative to a senator who does
not belong to the President's party, at least as far as delaying a hearing
on the nomination.
III. Initial Recruiment Procedures and Accomphshment of the President's
Ideological and Political Goals
While all administrations wish to appoint judges of high quality who
will earn the respect of their peers and of the nation, administrations
also wish to accomplish political and ideological goals through their ap-
pointment power. Recognizing that close cases on constitutional ques-
tions have important political effects, an administration may examine
philosophical backgrounds in selecting nominees and in reviewing rec-
ommendations from panels or senators. Additionally, the administra-
tion may wish to reform the selection system itself to open the process to




from groups that have been previously underrepresented on the federal
bench.
Carter's decision to employ panels at the circuit level and to empha-
size their use by senators at the district level reflected the goals he
wished to accomplish through the appointment process. Carter wished
to appoint judges who agreed with him philosophically, but he also
wished to reform the system itself. He wanted to include more partici-
pants in judicial selection and to increase the representation of women
and minorities. 32 Recalling his experience as governor, he chose the
panel system as a means of accomplishing those goals. Instead of a sin-
gle senator with a few aides or close friends selecting federal judges,
Carter felt panels would bring to judicial selection a cross-section of the
community that would lead to a corresponding diversity in the candi-
dates recommended. 33
Reagan also wishes to appoint judges who agree with him philosoph-
ically. The administration, however, is not as concerned with reforming
the selection system itself. It felt that the Carter system for circuit court
judges had not eliminated political considerations in judicial selection
and had added only a new layer of bureaucracy that would slow the
selection process down.'3 4 Thus, the administration abolished the cir-
cuit court panels. It instead chose to work within a more traditional
selection system, similar to that which operated prior to the Carter ad-
ministration. The Reagan system leaves initial recommendation proce-
dures to the senators at the district court level. It, however, reserves to
itself the prerogative to name circuit court candidates and employs that
prerogative when it feels it can further its goal through the appointment
of an outstanding conservative jurist.
An administration's goals and initial recommendation procedures are
interrelated. An administration determines its procedures based on the
goals that it wishes to accomplish. The Carter emphasis on "affirmative
action" led it to create the panels, while Reagan has sought conservative
jurists through a more traditional, non-panel system. However, the ac-
tual working of those procedures, checked by senatorial courtesy, deter-
132. A. NEFF, supra note 1, at 149.
133. Id. at 150-51.
134. Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Rose told the Legal Times: "When we [the
Reagan administration] came in, we explored very carefully whether it made sense for us to
establish circuit court commissions to fill circuit court vacancies. And I really was the one
who recommended against it, because I was confronted by a very practical problem. When I
came in May of 1981, we had some 80 appointments to fill. If all we were doing was elevating
to a higher level of political debate the various arguments of the various factions in the vari-
ous localities, I think we'd be at this point in time with nobody appointed and no assurance
that political considerations would be removed." Rose, supra note 103.
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mines how successful the administration will actually be in
accomplishing its goals. This part of the paper now turns to this second
question.
A. Recruitment Procedures and Goals under the Carter Administration
The Carter administration goal of increasing the representation of
women and minorities on the federal bench reflected a value judgment
that "a national judiciary should resemble its national demographic
constituency."' 135 Despite their increasing concern with civil rights and
other cases affecting the rights of women and minorities, 136 the federal
courts had remained the domain of white males. 137 In the creation of
152 new federal judges under the Omnibus Judgeship Act, Carter saw
an opportunity to diversify the federal bench. The greater number of
appointments not only created a greater number of potential places for
women and minorities but also gave the administration greater bargain-
ing power in dealing with senators and in exchanging support.138 Also,
the wording of the Act itself suggested that the President "give due con-
sideration to qualified individuals regardless of race, color, sex, religion,
or national origin." 139
The Carter administration significantly furthered the diversification
of the federal bench. For positions in the fifty states, the District of Co-
lumbia, and Puerto Rico, Carter appointed thirty-seven blacks, forty
women, three Asian-Americans, and sixteen Hispanics. 14° When Carter
left office, the percentage of women judges had risen from one percent to
nearly seven percent, while blacks had increased from four percent to
over eight percent.141
135. A. NEFF, supra note 1, at 150.
136. The number of civil rights cases involving the United States as a party increased
over 250% from 651 to 1,744 from 1972 to 1976. The number of civil rights cases between
private parties almost doubled from 5,482 to 10,585 for the same period. AD. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, CIVIL AND TRIAL STATISTICAL TABLES: TWELVE MONTH PERIODS ENDING
JUNE 30, 1970-1979 48-49, 68-69 (1980).
137. Under the Ford, Nixon, and Johnson administrations, blacks had constituted only
5.8%, 3.4%, and 4.1%, respectively, of all district court appointees. The percentage of women
nominees reached a high of 1.9% under Ford for the three administrations preceding Carter.
Goldman, Reagan's Judcal Appointments at Mid- Term, supra note 131, at 339.
138. Bell told the Judiciary Committee that he perceived his role as that of an "honest
broker" between the President and the senators on judicial nominations. Bell added: "I
think I have a duty--and this is a painful one-to say to a Senator: 'I wish you would
reconsider your list. There were some qualified minorities or women in your State and none
on the bench, and we are pledged to make the system more representative and wish you
would reconsider.' I have done that in some instances." Initial Heanng, supra note 9, at 17.
139. Omnibus Judgeship Act, supra note 37.
140. These figures are based on tables prepared by the American Bar Association Stand-
ing Committee on Federal Judiciary (on file with the Yale Law &Poicy Review).






COMPARISON OF CARTER PANEL AND NON-PANEL NOMINEES
ACCORDING TO RACE AND SEX
DISTRICT COURT NOMINEES 1979-80
Race Panel Process Non-Panel Process









These figures indicate that the Carter administration had a deep com-
mitment to increasing the number of women and minorities. One might
ask to what extent these increases were due to the use of the nominating
panels under the Carter administration. One way in which the panels
aided the administration was by expanding the number of persons con-
sidered. A study of the circuit court panels by the American Judicature
Society found that 43% of the candidates felt that they would not have
been considered but for the panels, usually because they felt that they
lacked political connections. 4 2 This expanded pool of candidates gave
the executive branch greater flexibility in choosing nominees.
When one compares the nominees who were selected through panel
processes with those selected through non-panel processes under the
Carter administration, one finds that the panels were slightly more
likely to result in the nomination of women or minority group members.
(Table III-1). Of the non-panel system nominees 19.6% had minority
status compared to 25.9% for the panel systems.' 43 Similar results were
found for sex: states not employing panels ended in the nomination of
women 8.9% of the time compared to 16.1% for the states employing
panels.
142. L. BERKSON & S. CARBON, supra note 1, at 138-39. Neff found that 53.1% of the
candidates for the district courts believed that they would have been considered absent the
commissions. A. NEFF, supra note 1, at 124.
143. Merit panel states were those listed by the Neff study. A. NEFF, supra note 1, at 54-
56. Race and sex were based on tables furnished by the ABA Standing Committee on Fed-
eral Judiciary. Only those judges nominated in 1979 and 1980 were considered for compar-
ing the outcomes of the two processes. Set alro A. NEFF, supra note 1, at 135-41 (similar
analysis for Carter appointees through February 20, 1980).
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Many senators who did not choose to follow the President's call for
panels nevertheless recommended persons from these non-traditional
groups; otherwise, a greater difference might have been found when the
results of the panel and non-panel systems-were compared. Maryland
Senator Paul Sarbanes, for instance, recommended one black male and
one woman without the aid of a panel, while Texas Senator Lloyd Bent-
sen recommended three Hispanics, one black woman, and one white
woman. Even so, the panels and the Carter guidelines were useful to the
administration in establishing a standard by which to judge non-panel
processes.
Not all district court panelists or senators shared Carter's commit-
ment to "affirmative action" in judicial selection.144 A study by the AJS
found that 52.3% of the district court panelists agreed with the state-
ment that "[t]he race of an applicant should never be considered in se-
lection." 14 5 Critics of the Carter administration-such as Senator Harry
F. Byrd, Jr. of Virginia--contended that the administration could not
maintain its affirmative action goals and still claim that the system was
based on merit. 146 Defending his position on the Virginia nomination
controversy, 4 7 Senator Byrd contended that a system based on "merit
selection" should aim solely for the "best qualified."' 148
Carter administration officials readily admitted that their idea of
"merit selection" went beyond a candidate's professional background.
In response to a question from Senator Paul Laxalt (Rep.-Nevada), At-
torney General Griffin Bell told the Senate Judiciary Committee that
given a "qualified" black or woman and three "exceptionally well quali-
fied" white males, Bell would support-and had supported-the nomi-
nation of the former where that group was not represented on the
federal bench. 149
The Carter administration defended its position on several grounds.
First, the Carter administration felt that in a democracy a national judi-
ciary should reflect its constituency. To achieve that goal, the adminis-
tration sought to correct an imbalance that it believed the past system
had created in favor of white males. 15° Second, Carter officials argued
144. For a more detailed analysis of affirmative action under the Carter administration,
see Goldman, Should There Be Af4fnative Action for the Judzciaoy?
, 
62 JUDICATURE 488 (1979);
Slotnick, Lowering the Bench or Raising It Higher?. Afmative Action andJudicial Selection Durng the
Carter Administration, I YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 270 (1983) (this issue).
145. A. NEFF, supra note 1, at 103.
146. Hearings, 96th Cong., Part 8, supra note 84, at 4.
147. See supra text accompanying note 83.
148. Hearings, 96th Cong., Part 8, supra note 84, at 2-5.
149. Initial Heanng, supra note 9, at 25.
150. Lipshutz & Huron, Achieving a More Representative Federal Judiciaiy, 62 JUDICATURE
483 (1979); A. NEFF, supra note 1, at 149.
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that a "pluralistic judiciary" would increase the "confidence of the di-
verse groupings in a pluralistic society . . . [over] a judiciary over-
whelmingly composed of one race, one social class, and one political
orientation . .. "151 Finally, administration officials challenged the
contention that quality was being sacrificed. As White House counsel
Robert J. Lipshutz and Douglas B. Huron argued:
The Administration decided early that qualifications could not be ignored.
Judicial positions are among the most critical in government, and the ap-
pointment of mediocre judges would be a disservice to all. Besides, lacklus-
ter appointments are unnecessary: there are well qualified minority and
female lawyers in most jurisdictions today. If the process is open enough to
permit identification of these people, some can and should be
appointed. 152
The panels also furthered Carter's accompanying goal to open the
recommendation process to more participants. According to an AJS
study, in the second round of appointments 42% of the presidentially-
appointed circuit panels were female while 23% were minority group
members.153 The AJS study noted that the number of minorities on the
panels was "approximately proportionate to their numbers in the gen-
eral population."'' 54 In addition to the panels, Carter encouraged in,
creased participation by including the National Bar Association and the
Federation of Women Lawyers in the pre-nomination screening process.
Critics, however, charged that the panels under Carter failed to "de-
politicize" the selection process and instead only opened it to other
Democrats. The Berkson and Carbon study concluded that "merit se-
lection" under Carter "may simply represent a form of merit selection of
Democrats, by Democrats."1 55 The study found that of the circuit court
panelists surveyed, all labeled themselves "moderate" or "liberal" in
political ideology.' 56 Further, a large majority (86%) of the panelists
were Democrats.' 57 If Carter's goal was to appoint judges "strictly on
the basis of merit without any consideration of political aspects or influ-
ence," 15 8 he fell short of his goal. Administration officials, however, ar-
gued that the goal of merit selection under Carter was not to "preclude
application of [political] factors," but only to "prevent their crass appli-
151. See Goldman, A Profdi of Carter's Judical Nominees, 62 JUDICATURE 246, 253 (1978).
152. Lipshutz & Huron, supra note 150, at 484.
153. L. BERKSON & S. CARBON, supra note 1, at 45.
154. Id at 52-53. Lower figures for women and minority groups were found for the
senatorially-appointed district court panels. Of all district court commissioners, 23.7% were
female and 15.1% minority. A. NEFF, supra note 1, at 92.
155. L. BERKSON & S. CARBON, supra note 1, at 183.
156. Id at 148.
157. Id at 146.
158. Miller, supra note 37.
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cation." 159 This goal, they argued, was furthered by substituting the
panel system with its emphasis on professional qualifications and open
procedures for the traditional system based on patronage and closed
procedures.160 The moderate-to-liberal views of the Carter circuit pan-
elists indicate that, like all presidents, Carter was concerned with nomi-
nating persons who shared his ideology.
The Carter administration employed the panel process at the circuit
level and encouraged similar processes at the district level in order to
diversify the federal bench and open the system to more participants.
Senatorial courtesy prevented the administration from completely ac-
complishing its goals. Not all senators responded to the President's call
to establish panels, and even among those that did, not all shared
Carter's commitment to increase the representation of women and mi-
norities. Still, President Carter appointed an unprecedented number of
women and minorities to the bench, and although it was largely limited
to other Democrats, Carter succeeded in bringing more public partici-
pation to the judicial selection process. 161
B. Goals and Recruitment Procedures under the Reagan Administration
Aside from nominating judges of high quality, the primary goal of the
Reagan administration is to nominate persons who believe in "judicial
restraint." Reaffirming the administration's commitment in a speech
before the Federal Legal Council, Attorney General William French
Smith announced that the administration has "helped to select appoin-
tees to the federal bench who understand the meaning of judicial re-
straint."1 62 Smith went on to outline what the administration meant by
"judicial restraint":
Three areas of judicial policy-making are of particular concern. First, the
erosion of restraint in considerations of justiciability. Second, some of the
standards by which state and federal statutes have been declared unconsti-
tutional-and, in particular, some of the analysis of so-called "fundamen-
tal rights" and "suspect classifications." And third, the extravagant use of
mandatory injunctions and remedial decrees.' 6 3
To further its goal, the Reagan administration has exercised more in-
fluence in the selection of circuit court judges than in the selection of
159. Lipshutz & Huron, supra note 150, at 483 (emphasis deleted).
160. Id at 484.
161. It should also be pointed out that the Carter administration appointed some con-
servative jurists, such as Cornelia Kennedy to the Sixth Circuit.
162. W. Smith, Attorney General, Remarks before the Federal Legal Council 1 (Oct. 29,
1981) (on file with the Yale Law & Policy Reviw).




those for the district courts. As we have seen,' 64 the administration has
selected its own candidates for circuit court positions, even where a sena-
tor has publicly announced his own choices. The appellate courts per-
form a more policy-oriented function than the district courts, giving the
administration greater incentive to assure the appointment of judges
who will tend toward minimizing the role of the federal judiciary.
Moreover, intervention in circuit court nominations does not interfere
with the traditional senatorial prerogatives associated with district court
positions. Although even here the senators often play a significant role,
the administration has maintained a prerogative to select its own candi-
date when it finds an outstanding conservative jurist or law professor. 165
For the district courts, the administration has allowed senators (or
congressional delegations where there is no senator) to play their tradi-
tional role in recommending candidates. For the most part, at least as
far as the ideology of the candidates is considered, the administration
may often depend on Republican senators who share its views to recom-
mend conservative candidates. The administration, however, has reaf-
firmed its desire that senators send more than one name per vacancy.
Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Rose told one interviewer that al-
though Republican senators initially followed the procedures, many sen-"
ators began to send only one name per vacancy. The result is "that we
haven't had a lot of flexibility at the district court level. We are pre-
pared to make another run at Congress for the next group of district
court appointments. . .."166
Even with this resistance by senators, the Reagan administration ap-
pears to be accomplishing its goal of appointing conservative judges.
Conservative interest groups, such as the Washington Legal Foundation,
praise the Reagan appointments.167 In replying to questions at Senate
confirmation hearings, Reagan nominees have generally supported "ju-
dicial restraint.1' 8 Although party affiliation is not a perfect index of
ideology, 97.1% of the district judges and 100% of the appellate judges
appointed in 1981-1982 were Republicans. 69
164. See su pra text accompanying note 105.
165. Rose, supra note 103.
166. Id
167. Cohodas, Reagan'sJudiia/Selections, supra note 42, at 84. Such praise is not universal.
Pro-life groups complain that they are being shut out of the selection process and that the
administration is not fulfilling the Republican party platform. Wash. Post, Sept. 10, 1982, at
A17, col. 1. Others have sharply criticized the ideological tilt of the Reagan circuit court
nominees. Goodman, Circuit Breaker, NATION, Jan. 1-8, 1983, at 4.
168. See, e.g., Heanngs, 97h Cong., Part 2, supra note 70, at 89, 93-94, 118-19.
169. Goldman, Reagan'sJudiia/ Appoinhiszts, supra note 131, at 339, 345. The Carter ad-
ministration appointed a high number of judges from its own party: 94.1% of the district
judges and 89.3% of the circuit judges were Democrats. Id
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Although all administrations seek to appoint judges who agree with
the administration on basic issues, administrations generally turn to
"principled" or "apolitical" arguments in justifying their ideological
goals. Scholars have long recognized that personal values often influ-
ence a judge's decision,1 7 0 but a similar recognition of political goals in
judicial selection does not carry over into an administration's public
statements. Both the Carter and Reagan administrations have sought a
"higher base" in justifying their ideological objectives. While Carter ap-
pealed to "merit," Reagan's attorney general, William French Smith,
told the National Conference of United States Attorneys that he "did
not urge the courts to follow the election returns." Instead, the Reagan
administration "will follow the election returns . . . and urge a return
by the courts to neutral principles" since judicial intervention "foster[s]
their politicization" and endangers the legitimacy of courts. 71
The Carter and Reagan justifications for their selection criteria have
parallels in the continuing debate concerning law and politics in judicial
decisionmaking. Just as the judiciary loses legitimacy when it is per-
ceived as engaging not in "law" but instead in "politics," the selection of
the judicial branch by the other two branches loses its legitimacy if it
publicly appears too political. If it appears to be aimed at turning the
court away from past "law," judicial selection will tend to undermine
judicial independence. As one author described, "court curbing"
schemes are likely to be rejected and criticized:
[C]ourt curbing is difficult. . . . [T]here is an underlying appreciation in
American political thought for a properly independent judiciary. There
seems to be a general consensus that tampering with judicial independence
is a serious matter and the consequences of rash reprisals against the court
as an institution may upset the original constitutional balance that has
worked so well for so long.
To be successful, any political attempt to adjust or limit the judicial
power must be-and must be perceived to be-a principled rather than a
merely partisan response. Only then will the issue of judicial activism be
met on a ground high enough to transcend the more common-and gener-
ally fruitless-debates over judicial liberalism and judicial
conservatism. 1 72
In addition to appointing judges who believe in judicial restraint, the
Reagan administration has also stated that it wishes to appoint women
and minorities. Thus far, the Reagan administration has had less suc-
170. See, e.g., B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESs (1921).
171. Wash. Post, Nov. 17, 1981, at A14, col. 1.




cess in doing so; officials admit that they would "like to do better.' ' 73
At the end of his second year in office, Reagan had appointed three
women, two Hispanics, and one Asian-American to the district courts
and one black to the circuit courts out of a total of eighty-eight appoint-
ments.1 74 Groups representing women and minorities have severely crit-
icized the Reagan administration and have contended that the system is
closed to them and their members. 175
A number of factors are helpful in examining Reagan's lack of success
in appointing women and minorities. One such factor is that while both
administrations have publicly embraced the goal of appointing women
and minorities, their selection criteria in this respect differ widely. The
Carter administration, as Attorney General Bell pointed out, was willing
to select a woman, black, or Hispanic over a white male who might be
viewed as having higher "professional" or "objective" qualifications.
Deputy Attorney General Edward Schmults stated the Reagan ap-
proach: "We certainly are interested in reaching out and into the appli-
cant pool for well-qualified minorities and women, but I think once
people are in that pool, we are looking for the very best judges we can
find."1
76
A second factor limiting the nomination of women and minorities is
the administration's adherence to a philosophy of judicial conservatism.
Assistant Attorney General Rose said: "We're prepared to do our best
to open up the judiciary to more women and minorities. . . . The
[P]resident, however, is unwilling to put someone on the court that does
not share his view on the role of the courts in our society, just because
that person belongs to a particular group.' 1 7 7 The pool of blacks and
women who agree with the administration may be small since President
Reagan received limited support from these groups in the 1980
173. Rose, supra note 103. Reagan officials received severe criticism for their handling of
the proposed nomination of Judith Whittaker for a position on the Eighth Circuit. Although
Ms. Whittaker was rated highly by the ABA and enjoyed strong support in the legal commu-
nity, her nomination encountered political opposition, mostly from pro-.life groups. Eventu-
ally, the administration chose Judge John R. Gibson for the position. Cohodas, Reagan's
Judicial Selections, supra note 42, at 84; see aLro N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1982, at A26, col. 1; Wash.
Post, Dec. 23, 1981, at AI, col. 6.
174. Cohodas, Reagan's Judial Selecttrns, supra note 42, at 83. As of April 1, 1983, Reagan
had appointed two more women to district court positions (based on figures provided by the
ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary).
175. Susan Ness of the National Women's Political Caucus told one reporter, "His record
is absolutely deplorable .... I'm surprised because he made a point during the campaign
to appoint women to lower courts, and it is not as though he hasn't had ample opportunity."
Cohodas, Reagan Slow in Appointing Women, Blacks, Hispanics to FederalJudicia v Seats, 39 CONG.
Q. WEEKLY REP. 2559 (1981).
176. Id. at 2560.
177. Rose, supra note 103.
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election. 78
Reagan administration officials also point to the relatively small
number of women and minority group lawyers with substantial legal
experience. 1 79 United States Census figures show that only 1.9% of law-
yers in 1972 were non-white, compared to 4.2% for 1980. For women,
the figure rose from 3.8% to 12.8%.180 Many of the nation's women and
minority group lawyers therefore have entered the legal profession only
in recent years. Since the Reagan administration appears to favor those
candidates with at least twelve years at the bar,'8 ' many of these lawyers
would not be considered for a judgeship under Reagan. Administration
officials argue that appointing a great number of judges from these
groups at this time would strain the quality of the federal bench,
8 2
while representatives of women and minorities contend that a high
number of qualified applicants are available.
83
Reagan administration officials also argue that a greater number of
vacancies would allow them to appoint more women and minorities.
The administration, they contend, could then bargain with senators in
states where there was more than one judicial vacancy-the administra-
tion could honor the senator's choice of one judgeship in exchange for
the senator's approval of an administration candidate. A possible move
to expand the number of judgeships has begun. Last year, the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts reported favorably a bill to create
forty-five new judgeships.'a4
The Reagan administration also lacks procedures, such as the circuit
court panels, that the Carter administration used in obtaining a large
pool of applicants. 85 (Remarkably, all three of the women nominated
178. A New York Times/CBS News poll of the 1980 election showed that 82% of blacks
voted for Carter while only 14% voted for Reagan. Among females, support for Carter and
Reagan was split: 45% for Carter and 46% for Reagan. Among females favoring the Equal
Rights Amendment, however, Reagan only drew 32% of the vote. N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1980,
at 28, col. 4.
179. Mann, Wash. Post, Sept. 29, 1982, at Cl, col. 1.
180. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 402 (1981).
181. During the period covered by this study for Reagan nominees (January 20, 1981 to
November 15, 1982), no Reagan district court nominee had less than 12 years at the bar.
182. Rose, supra note 103.
183. Susan Ness commented, "This is just malarky. . . . Whenever the administration
has passed over well qualified women, the argument has always been they were trying to take
the most well qualified people available." Cohodas, Reagan Slow in Appointing Women, supra
note 175, at 2560.
184. 40 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1380 (1982).
185. Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Rose admitted, "[The panels] did achieve a
much greater diversity of types of people to go on the bench, and that in and of itself was a
desirable thing." Rose, supra note 103.
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Judicial Selection Panels
during the period of this study came from states employing panels. 186)
The administration's decision to end the Carter practice of consulting
with the National Bar Association and the Federation of Women Law-
yers also blocked a potential source of information from groups repre-
senting minorities and women. As an alternative, Reagan officials have
urged women and minority groups to bring the names of qualified per-
sons to the attention of senators. 8 7
Although President Reagan indicated that he sincerely believed in
such appointments through the O'Connor nomination, hopes that the
Reagan administration would appoint a significant number of women
and minorities remain to be fulfilled. As the 1984 election draws closer,
the administration and Republican senators may appoint more judges
from these groups in order to build electoral support. Many Republican
senators have also utilized their first choices for judgeships and may be
more willing to recommend women or minority candidates.
In sum, the Reagan administration has aimed at appointing conserva-
tive judges to the federal bench. To accomplish its goals, the adminis-
tration has shown itself willing to go outside the bounds of senatorial
courtesy to select a prominent conservative jurist. At the district level it
has had difficulty in persuading senators to make more than one recom-
mendation per vacancy. This has restricted the administration in nomi-
nating persons for the district courts. Even so, the Reagan
administration has furthered its goal of appointing conservative jurists
at both the district and circuit levels.
In the appointment of women and minorities, the administration has
had less success. This is due largely to a restricted pool of candidates
that can meet administration standards in judicial philosophy and years
of legal experience. Although the panel system aided the Carter admin-
istration in increasing the pool of candidates, it is doubtful that the Rea-
gan administration will create panels for circuit court positions. As an
alternative, the administration has urged representatives of these groups
to give senators the names of possible candidates for district court posi-
tions. The administration may also increase its efforts in urging senators
to send more than one name per vacancy.
186. Carol Los Mansmann (Pennsylvania), Elizabeth A. Kovachevich (Florida), Cynthia
Holcomb Hall (California).
187. Mann, supra note 179.
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IV. Initial Recommendation Procedures and the Background Characteristics of
the Nominees
A. DIstrict Court Nominees
While the implementation and operation of various initial recommen-
dation procedures can determine how successful an administration will
be in accomplishing its ideological goals, the operation of these proce-
dures may also influence the type of judges selected and which profes-
sional and background characteristics will be emphasized in judicial
selection. The two preceding parts of this study make comparisons di-
rectly between the Carter and Reagan administrations, but this part of
the analysis is somewhat different in making comparisons both within
and across the two administrations.
As we have seen, under both Reagan and Carter, some senators have
chosen to use panel systems for district court nominees, while others
have not. In evaluating the effect of the panel process on the composi-
tion of the judiciary, 188 one may ask whether district court nominees
chosen through a panel process differ from those chosen through a non-
panel process. Conducting such an analysis within a single administra-
tion permits the comparison to be made in a framework in which presi-
dential goals, attitudes, and screening procedures following initial
recommendation are constant.' 8 9 The background characteristics of
panel and non-panel nominees in areas such as experience, legal educa-
tion, and ABA ratings will be compared first under the Carter adminis-
tration and then under the Reagan administration. The results of these
comparisons may then be used to see if there are similarities in the re-
sults of the two administrations.
"Panel nominees" will be compared with "non-panel nominees" in
four areas: professional experience (judicial experience, government at-
torney experience, law professor experience), age and years at the bar,
legal education (status of law school attended), and ABA ratings. tg°
188. Although this study categorizes district court selection systems according to "panel"
and "non-panel" processes, the processes actually set up by senators within each category
differ. For a comparison of panel processes in the Carter administration, see A. NEFF, supra
note 1, at 53-85. For the purpose of this analysis, "Carter panel nominees" are nominees from
states listed by Neff as employing panels. "Reagan panel nominees" are from states listed in
Table 11-3. Senators who did not elect to use formal panel processes often stressed to the
author that a careful, informal search was conducted before submitting recommendations to
the President. See, e.g., letter from Sen. John W. Warner of Virginia to Gary Fowler (Nov. 23,
1982) (on file with the Yale Law &Policy Review).
189. Slotnick, Judicial Selection Systems and Nomination Outcomes: Does the Process
Make a Difference? 5 (1982) (unpublished) (on file with the Yale Law &Policy Review). In
comparing nominees from states using panels with those from states not using panels, Slotnick
found few statistically significant relationships.




The background characteristics examined here are not exhaustive of the
variables that one might consider in defining "merit" or in evaluating
panel and non-panel procedures, but they do offer an initial basis for
comparisons of the outcomes of the two procedures. 191 The data consist
of biographical information collected on all 1979 and 1980 district court
nominees and all Reagan district court nominees nominated by Novem-
ber 15, 1982.192 (The study was limited to the last two years of the
Carter administration since the push for panels in district court nomina-
tions increased significantly with the passage of the Omnibus Judgeship
Act of 1978.)
The working hypothesis for these comparisons was that the emphasis
of the panel process on legal experience, professional accomplishments,
and outreach to those who would not otherwise be considered would
considered. The nomination of Len J. Paletta for the Western District of Pennsylvania was
not considered since Mr. Paletta died shortly after nomination.
The status of the law school attended was determined by dividing schools into categories of
"prestigious" and "less prestigious." Any law school that was listed by Barton's Guide to Law
Schools on the following surveys was considered "prestigious":
1. Ladd-Lipset Report
2. Canter Report (Faculty Quality-Top 10)
3. Juris Doctor Survey (Deans-Academic Quality)
4. Juris Doctor Survey (Readers---Academic Quality)
5. Blau-Marguiles Survey
BARRON'S GUIDE TO LAW SCHOOLS 54-58 (4th ed. 1980).
This produced a list of thirteen law schools: Boalt Hall (Berkeley), Chicago, Columbia,
Duke, Georgetown, Harvard, Michigan, New York University, Pennsylvania, Stanford, Vir-
ginia, Texas, Yale.
Biographical information was obtained from Department of Justice biographies reprinted
in Senate hearings. In the case of five district judges and thirteen circuit judges under Carter,
no biography was available. In these cases a biography was obtained from WHO's WHO IN
AMERICA, 1982-83 (1982), WHO'S WHO IN AMERICAN LAw (1979), or THE AMERICAN
BENCH (1978). A potentially richer and more reliable source for such information, the Senate
Judiciary Committee questionnaires, was not available for this study.
Since the Department of Justice biographies summarize a nominee's legal experience, a
nominee was scored as having government attorney experience or teaching experience only if
the biography listed no other experience during the period of such service (unless the compet-
ing experience was specifically listed as part-time). A nominee who had government attorney
and teaching experience at the same time was scored as having government attorney experi-
ence. Government attorney experience was defined as work for more than one year with a
state, local, or federal administrative or law enforcement office. Where biographical informa-
tion did not produce a clear result according to this definition, the nominee was scored as
having such experience.
Age and years at the bar were determined as of December 31 in the year confirmed. Un-
confirmed nominees under the Carter administration were determined as of December 31,
1980 or the year in which their nomination was withdrawn. All Reagan nominees during the
period of this study have been confirmed.
191. Many authors have debated and pondered the question of what constitutes a "good
judge." See, e.g., Rosenberg, The Qualities ofJusties-Are They Strainable?, 44 TEx. L. REV.
1063 (1966); GoldmanJudicial Selection and the Qualities that Make a "Good"Judge, 462 ANNALS
112 (1982). The difficulty is that many such qualities (such as fairness, judicial temperament,
and logical reasoning) are intangible and therefore beyond the reach of empirical study.
192. Judicial experience was verified with data compiled by Sheldon Goldman.
343
Yale Law & Policy Review
lead to the nomination of persons who, as a whole, would be more likely
than non-panel nominees to exhibit certain characteristics in these ar-
eas. For instance, nomination panels under the Carter administration
were instructed to consider judicial experience, familiarity with govern-
mental processes, and legal scholarship as positive characteristics. 193 In
addition, the Berkson-Carbon study of circuit court panelists found that
96% of the respondents held the professional experience of the candi-
dates to be an "important" or "very important" factor. 194 Thus it was
expected that panels would produce a higher percentage of nominees
with judicial, government attorney, and law professor experience than
would the non-panel processes. 195 Berkson and Carbon also found that
panelists considered legal education as an important factor.' 96 This
finding led to the hypothesis that panel nominees would be more likely
to have graduated from schools with "prestigious" reputations than
would non-panel nominees. In age and professional experience, admin-
istrations generally prefer those with substantial experience, but who are
also young enough to enjoy a long tenure on the bench.197 The study
here assumed a "prime" age bracket of 44 to 57, which was approxi-
mately within one standard deviation from the mean for all nominees
TABLE IV-1
EXPECTATIONS
Panel nominees will be more likely than non-panel nominees:
1. to have judicial experience
2. to have experience as a government attorney
3. to have experience teaching law on a full-time basis
4. to be between the ages of forty-four and fifty-seven
5. to have graduated from law schools with prestigious
reputations
6. to have more than twelve years at the bar at the time of
nomination
7. to have ABA ratings of "Well Qualified" or
"Exceptionally Well Qualified".
193. Department of Justice, Supplemental Instructions § B.3-B.4 (Oct. 2, 1978), reprinted
in L. BERKSON & S. CARBON, supra note 1, at 222-23.
194. L. BERKSON & S. CARBON, supra note 1, at 108.
195. Slotnick performed similar tests on Caner nominees using data obtained from Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee questionnaires. Slotnick, Judicial Selection Systems, supra note 189,
at 9-10, 13, 18-20.
196. L. BERKSON & S. CARBON, supra note 1, at 108.
197. Under President Carter, circuit court panels originally were instructed to consider a
candidate over the age of 60 "only in unusual circumstances and if especially meritorious."
Department of Justice, Supplemental Instructions § B.7 (Apr. 22, 1977), reprined in L. BERK-




under both administrations. Earlier versions of Carter executive orders
and supplemental instructions also emphasized that candidates nor-
mally should have twelve years at the bar. 9 8 Use of panels therefore
was expected to result in the nomination of fewer persons who fell below
this standard. Finally, ABA ratings are considered as an index of merit,
and it was expected that panel nominees would be more likely to be
found "Well Qualified" or "Exceptionally Well Qualified" than non-
panel nominees. (Expectations are summarized in Table IV-1.)
As we shall see, the differences between panel and non-panel nomi-
nees-especially in the Carter administration-are not dramatic in all
cases. Indeed, the level of statistical significance for comparisons in the
Carter administration 199 indicates that factors other than the process
used in recommendation may have had a greater impact on the type of
judge selected. With the exception of education and age, however, re-
sults in the Carter administration are consistent with expectations. This
consistency suggests a pattern in the comparison of panel and non-panel
nominees that is mirrored in the Reagan administration. Moreover, the
differences between Reagan panel and non-panel nominees tend to be
greater than those found between Carter panel and non-panel
nominees.
1. Comparison of Background Characteristics of Carter Panel and Non-Panel
Nominees
A higher percentage of the Carter panel nominees was expected to
have experience as a judge, government attorney, or law professor than
the Carter non-panel nominees. This was the case, although the differ-
ence in judicial experience was not large. As Table IV-2 indicates, the
greatest difference between the two groups lay in teaching experience
(10.7% for Carter panel nominees compared to 1.8% for Carter non-
panel nominees). In fact, all but one of the thirteen nominees with full-
time teaching experience were selected through a panel process. Since
law professors on the whole may be less politically prominent than
judges or government attorneys, they particularly may have benefitted
198. Department of Justice, Supplemental Instructions § B.4 (Oct. 2, 1978), reprinted in L.
BERKSON & S. CARBON, supra note 1, at 223.
199. Results are summarized in Tables IV-2 and IV-3. Significance tests are of limited
utility since the size of the population is small and since the "sample" consists of the entire
population. See H. WEISBERG & B. BOWEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO SURVEY RESEARCH AND
DATA ANALYSIS 110 (1977). Levels of statistical significance are given in the tables, along
with measures of covariation. Kendall's tau is a commonly used measure of association that
measures the extent to which a change in one variable is accompanied by a change in another
variable. Id. at 153-54.
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TABLE IV-2




Criteria Nominees Nominees Tau Sig.
% of Nominees
Judicial Experience 51.8 58.9 .07 .19
Govt. Atty. Exp. 32.1 46.4 .14 .04
Teaching Experience 1.8 10.7 .16 .02
Age between 44 and 57 66.1 66.1 .00 .50
12 or less years'at bar 10.7 8.9 .03 .36
Degree from "prestige" law school 37.5 33.9 -. 04 .32
ABA rating of WQ or EWQ 41.1 48.2 .07 .19
Chart covers Carter nominees from January 1, 1979 to January 20, 1981.
WQ = Well Qualified
EWQ = Exceptionally Well Qualified
from panel emphasis on legal scholarship and outreach to candidates
who would not otherwise have been considered. The group of Carter
panel nominees was also more likely to have had government attorney
experience (46.4% compared to 32.1%) and slightly more likely to have
had judicial experience (58.9% compared to 51.8%).
In comparing the age at nomination of the Carter panel and non-
panel nominees, the study examined the percentage of nominees who
fell in the 44-57 age bracket. This eliminated those who fell in both the
youngest and oldest categories. The two groups were remarkably identi-
cal.20 The panel systems operating during the Carter administration
selected a slightly lower percentage of nominees that had twelve or less
years at the bar than the non-panel systems (8.9% for Carter panel nom-
inees compared to 10.7% for Carter non-panel nominees).2 0 1
The comparison of the educational backgrounds is contrary to expec-
tations and indicates that Carter non-panel nominees were more likely
to have graduated from a "prestigious" institution than the panel nomi-
nees (37.5% compared to 33.9%). This suggests several possibilities.
200. The two groups were also identical in the groups younger and older than the
"prime" age bracket. Of the panel and non-panel nominees 21.4% were under 44 while 12.5%
were above 57.
201. When one excludes those who had exactly twelve years at the bar, the relationship is
reversed. Of the panel nominees 6.3% had less than twelve years at the bar compared to 3.6%
of the non-panel nominees. Only nine (5.4%) of the Carter nominees had less than twelve




While studies of panelists' attitudes indicate that some weight is at-
tached to an applicant's educational background, 20 2 there are obviously
many more ways that one may present an impressive educational record
than by graduating from a "major" law school. Editorship of the
school's law review, class standing, and moot court prizes are but a few.
Unfortunately, this study did not permit analysis of all these factors.
Furthermore, the emphasis on outreach in Carter panel systems may
have created a more "egalitarian" view that led panels to select a person
who had excelled at a school with less national prestige.
A higher percentage of Carter panel nominees received a rating of
"Well Qualified" or "Exceptionally Well Qualified" from the American
Bar Association. Of the panel nominees 48.2% received such ratings
compared to 41.1% of the non-panel nominees. This indicates that the
panels and the ABA committee may have had similar emphases that led
to awarding higher ratings to the panel nominees.20 3
In sum, the analysis of the Carter administration produced the ex-
pected results in all areas but education. The differences between
Carter panel and Carter non-panel nominees, however, were not strong
except in teaching and government attorney experience and, to a lesser
extent, in ABA ratings. These results will now be contrasted with those
for the Reagan administration.
2. Comparison of Background Characteristics of Reagan Panel and Non-Panel
District Court Nominees
Differences in background characteristics between Reagan panel and
non-panel district court nominees were greater than differences between
Carter panel and non-panel nominees (see Table IV-3). This was par-
ticularly true in the area of judicial experience. Reagan panel nominees
were more likely to have such experience than Reagan non-panel nomi-
nees (51.4% compared to 32.1%). Similar results were found for govern-
ment attorney experience (37.1% compared to 25.0%). As under the
Carter administration, district court nominees with prior teaching expe-
rience were selected almost exclusively through panel processes. 20 4
Higher percentages of panel nominees therefore were found in all three
experience fields in both administrations. Increased use of the panels
202. L. BERKSON & S. CARBON, supra note 1, at 108.
203. For a detailed statistical analysis of the relationship between background character-
istics and ABA ratings, see Slotnick, The ABA Standing Committee on Feera1Judicia.y: A Contem-
poray Assesiment (pt. 2), 66 JUDICATURE 385 (1983).
204. For the period considered under the Reagan administration, four of the five district
court nominees with full-time teaching experience originated through panel processes.
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TABLE IV-3




Criteria Nominees Nominees Tau Sig.
% of Nominees
Judicial Experience 32.1 51.4 .19 .06
Govt. Atty. Exp. 25.0 37.1 .13 .15
Teaching Experience 3.6 11.4 .14 .13
Age between 44 and 57 67.9 85.7 .22 .02
12 or less yrs. at bar 0.0 0.0 - -
Degree from "prestige" law school 42.9 22.9 -. 21 .05
ABA rating of WQ or EWQ 28.6 65.7 .37 .00
Chart covers Reagan nominees through November 15, 1982.
WQ = Well Qualified
EWQ = Exceptionally Well Qualified
therefore might lead to the nomination of more persons with such
experience.
The Reagan panel nominees were also more likely to be between the
ages of 44 and 57 than the non-panel nominees (85.7% compared to
67.9%).205 Since no Reagan district court nominee had less than twelve
years at the bar, no difference occurred between Reagan panel and non-
panel nominees on this test.
As under the Carter administration, results in educational back-
ground were contrary to expectations. Reagan non-panel nominees
were much more likely than panel nominees to have graduated from a
prestigious law school (42.9% compared to 22.9%). This is a larger dif-
ference than that found in the Carter administration between non-panel
and panel nominees. Again, this reflects a tendency among panelists to
recommend candidates who graduated from less prestigious schools.
This result still leaves open the question of whether panels place heavier
emphasis on law school honors than on the "prestige" of the law school
attended.
When one compares the ABA ratings of Reagan panel and non-panel
nominees, a sharp distinction is noted between the two categories. Rea-
gan panel nominees were much more likely than Reagan non-panel
205. Of the Reagan non-panel nominees, 10.7% were under 44 while 21.4% were 60 or
above. For the Reagan panel nominees, 14.3% were below 44 while none were above 57.
This indicates that the panels were more likely to choose younger candidates.
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nominees to receive a rating of "Well Qualified" or "Exceptionally Well
Qualified" from the ABA. Of the Reagan panel nominees 65.7% re-
ceived such ratings compared to only 28.6% of the non-panel nomi-
nees-a difference of 37.1%. This is a much greater difference between
panel and non-panel nominees than that found under the Carter
administration.
In sum, the comparison of Reagan panel nominees with non-panel
nominees produced the expected results in all areas but education. To
this extent, the results of the Carter and Reagan administrations are
similar. Dissimilarity arises when one looks at the magnitude of those
differences between panel and non-panel nominees. Reagan panel nom-
inees were much more likely than Reagan non-panel nominees to have
judicial experience, to be in the prime age bracket, and to have higher
ABA ratings, and these differences exceeded those noted in the same
areas for the Carter administration.
3. Possible Explanations for Differences in the Magnitude of the Results
Between the Carter and Reagan Administrations
The consistency of the results with those expected supports the idea
that panels produce nominees with stronger background characteristics
in professional experience, age, and ABA rating. Moreover, these differ-
ences occur within single administrations in which screening procedures
following initial recommendation are constant. They are also in line
with the expectations drawn from previous studies of criteria that panel-
ists emphasize in screening applicants. 2 0 6
Several explanations for the greater differences in background charac-
teristics between panel and non-panel nominees in the Reagan adminis-
tration should be explored. First, it should be noted that the size of the
two populations is different. For the period of this study, Carter nomi-
nated more district judges than Reagan (168 nominees compared to 63).
This may account for some differences since additional nominations
may eventually even out the results in the Reagan administration. In
interpreting the results from the Reagan administration, one should
keep in mind the relatively small number of nominees; for example, a
shift in just four of the non-panel nominees in teaching and government
attorney experience would have reversed the results. Further, the
smaller differences in the Carter administration may be due partly to
different screening procedures following recommendation under the
Carter administration. The Carter screening procedures could have cre-
ated a greater consistency in the background characteristics of the
Carter nominees.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 193-197.
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The reasons for greater differences in the Reagan administration be-
tween panel and non-panel nominees does not seem to lie in differences
in background characteristics between the nominees of the two adminis-
trations. In fact, Carter and Reagan district court nominees are roughly
similar in most categories when they are compared as a whole without
regard to the recommendation process employed (see Table IV-4). In
government attorney experience, teaching experience, status of law
school attended, years at bar, and ABA ratings, no difference was
greater than 10.0%. Only in judicial experience and age are there nota-
ble differences.20 7
TABLE IV-4





Judicial Experience 56.5 42.9
Govt. Atty. Experience 41.7 31.7
Teaching Experience 7.7 7.9
Age between 44-57 66.1 77.8
12 or less yrs. at bar 9.5 0.0
Degree from "prestige" law school 35.1 31.7
ABA rating of WQ or EWQ 45.8 49.2
Chart covers district court nominees from January 1, 1979 to
November 15, 1982.
WQ = Well Qualified
EWQ = Exceptionally Well Qualified
Another explanation that is not supported is that the "dual purpose"
of the Carter panels in promoting "merit" and "affirmative action" di-
luted the differences between the panel and non-panel nominees. One
might argue that where the panels chose a woman or minority candi-
date, the panels weakened their standards in other areas. As Slotnick
points out in this issue, however, nominees in the Carter administration
who were women or members of minority groups had educational back-
grounds similar to those of white males. They were actually more likely
207. The difference in judicial experience is due to the relatively low percentage of nomi-
nees with judicial experience selected through Reagan non-panel processes. While approxi-
mately 50% of the nominees selected through Carter panel (58.9%), Carter non-panel (51.8%),
and Reagan panel (51.4%) had judicial experience, only 32.1% of the Reagan non-panel nom-




to be sitting judges and law professors. Women and minority group
members, however, were more likely than white male nominees to have
had less than twelve years at the bar and to have lower ABA ratings,
although these differences do not account for the relatively small differ-
ence in ABA ratings between Carter panel and non-panel nominees. 20 8
Another possible explanation is that the difference in the magnitude
of the panel/non-panel comparison in the two administrations may re-
flect the background preferences of the senators creating the panels
rather than the difference in the recommendation procedure. 20 9 Indi-
viduals involved in the judicial selection process told the author that the
procedure used is not as important as the senator involved in the partic-
ular selection.2 1 0 The senators who wish to emphasize judicial experi-
ence, trial experience, and the attributes that lead to higher ABA ratings
are the ones who take greater care in judicial selection and are the ones
who are inclined to create panels under Reagan. In the Carter adminis-
tration, the senators who would have created the panels on their own
were joined by senators who created the panel only in response to the
President's call. Some of these latter panels may have acted only under
the control of the senator. They may well have suggested the nomina-
tion of the person who would have been recommended by the senator.
under the traditional, non-panel process. That these nominees were in-
cluded with those of the "willing" senators could have diluted the differ-
ence between the two groups of panel and non-panel nominees in the
208. Slotnick, Affrmative Action andJudiial Selection, supra note 144, at 285, 291-93 (this
issue). Since women nominees were more likely to have low ABA ratings than men, we might
expect the difference in ABA ratings between Carter male panel and non-panel nominees to
be larger than the difference found between panel and non-panel nominees when all Carter
nominees are considered. When only Carter male nominees are considered, however, the
difference between panel and non-panel nominees compared to that found in the original
relationship is only slightly larger. Among Carter nominees, 56.4% of the male panel nomi-
nees had high ABA ratings compared to 45.1% for male non-panel nominees. This is a differ-
ence of 11.3% compared to a difference of 7.1% in the original relationship.
When only the white nominees under Carter are considered, the difference between panel
and non-panel nominees compared to that found in the original relationship is again only
slightly larger. Of white Carter panel nominees 56.6% had higher ABA ratings compared to
48.9% of white Carter non-panel nominees. This produced a difference of 7.7% compared to
the 7.1% difference found in the original relationship for Carter panel and non-panel nomi-
nees.
Thus, it does not appear that the "affirmative action" goals of Carter panel processes
caused the difference in ABA ratings between panel and non-panel nominees to be smaller
than that found in the Reagan administration between panel and non-panel nominees. For a
discussion of the ABA and its evaluation of women and minorities, see Slotnick, ABA Standing
Committee (pt. 2), supra note 203, at 387.
The ABA's evaluation of women and minorities recently sparked debate between judicial-
politics scholars Henry J. Abraham and Sheldon Goldman. See 66 JUDICATURE 436 (1983).
209. Slotnick, Reforms iJudicial Selection (pt. 1), supra note 33, and supra text accompany-
ing note 66.
210. This observation is based on interviews with Senate aides and interest groups lobby-
ists involved in judicial selection.
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Carter administration. Under the Reagan administration, the panels
are more likely to be employed by senators who are willing to allow the
panels to function independently. The differences between panel and
non-panel nominees, under Carter, therefore, would be much smaller
than the differences in the Reagan administration where the decision to
employ the panel is the senator's own.
B. Circuit Court Nominees
Comparison of the background characteristics of Reagan and Carter
circuit court nominees does not lend itself as easily to the panel/non-
panel comparison employed for district court nominees since only one
method was used in each administration. Carter relied exclusively on
his presidentially-appointed panels while Reagan chose not to use the
panels. Differences in background characteristics between "Carter
panel" and "Reagan non-panel" may reflect more the differences in ad-
ministration goals, attitudes, and screening procedures rather than the
differences in the initial recommendation procedures. Nevertheless,
some observations can be made (see Table IV-5).
TABLE IV-5





Judicial Experience 56.7 73.7
Govt. Atty. Experience 40.0 42.1
Teaching Experience 20.0 26.3
Age between 44-57 58.3 68.4
12 or less yrs. at bar 0.0 5.3
Degree from "prestige" law school 61.7 42.1
ABA rating of WQ or EWQ 75.0 68.4
Chart covers circuit court nominees from January 1, 1979 to
November 15, 1982.
WQ = Well Qualified
EWQ = Exceptionally Well Qualified
The most notable difference between the Carter and Reagan appel-
late court nominees is in judicial experience. Of the nineteen Reagan
circuit court nominees, fourteen (73.7%) had judicial experience prior to




four were law professors. In all, 26.3% of Reagan circuit court nominees
had teaching experience. These compare to Carter administration
figures of 56.7% for judicial experience and 20.0% for full-time teaching
experience. Reagan nominees were more likely to be between 44 and 57
while Carter nominees tended to be younger. 2 11 Carter administration
nominees were more likely to have graduated from "prestigious" law
schools (61.7% compared to 42.1%) and to earn ABA ratings of "Well
Qualified" or "Exceptionally Well Qualified" (75.0% compared to
68.4%). 2 12
The results of the comparison between Reagan and Carter circuit
court nominees differ from the expectations that were stated for compar-
ing nominees solely on the panel/non-panel basis. "Carter panel" nomi-
nees were more likely than "Reagan non-panel" nominees to have high
ABA ratings and to have graduated from "prestige" law schools. At the
same time, "Reagan non-panel" nominees scored higher percentages in
judicial experience. They were also more likely to be in the "prime" age
bracket than "Carter panel" nominees. To some degree, this reflects the
Reagan administration concern for nominees with proven records of ju-
dicial decisionmaking that give administration officials more confidence
in the nominee's background and philosophy. The comparison of cir-
cuit court nominees reminds us of the importance in differences not only
in the procedures but also in the personalities of those employing the
procedures. 213
Summaq and Conclusion
The Carter and Reagan administrations adopted different
frameworks in judicial recommendation and selection procedures.
Carter's framework emphasized the use of nominating commissions, cre-
ating its own system at the circuit court level and actively encouraging
senators to use panels at the district court level. The Reagan adminis-
tration's framework is more traditional in leaving largely to senators the
responsibility of initiating district court selection but in reserving to it-
self the prerogative to select its own circuit court candidates. The pur-
pose of this paper has been to observe senatorial responses to these
frameworks, to examine how the operation of the initial recommenda-
211. Of the Reagan circuit court nominees 68.4% were between 44 and 57 compared to
58.3% of the Carter nominees. Of the Carter nominees 13.3% were younger than 44, com-
pared to 5.3% of the Reagan nominees.
212. Three of the six Reagan nominees who received "Qualified" ratings were law profes-
sors who may have lacked the trial experience the ABA considers important.
213. For a more detailed comparison of Carter and Reagan nominees without regard to
panel process, see Goldman, Reagan'sJudwid Appointmens at Mid- Terr, supra note 131.
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tion procedures can affect the furtherance of the administration's ideo-
logical and political goals, and to explore how different initial
recommendation procedures may lead to the selection of judges with
particular background characteristics.
(1) Senatorial responses to presidential initiatives in judicial selection. Al-
though President Carter put more emphasis on the use of panels for
district court positions than President Reagan, a majority of the nomi-
nees in both administrations during the period of this study were recom-
mended through panel procedures. This continued use of the panels
suggests that senators have found them useful in fulfilling their own
political and administrative needs. It also strongly suggests that the
nominating panels have acquired a permanent place in the selection of
district court judges.
In the selection of circuit court judges, the Reagan decision to discon-
tinue the panels creates a sharp distinction between the two administra-
tions. Although both administrations have allowed senatorial
participation in the pre-nomination process, the Carter panels forced
senators who wished to promote the candidacy of a particular person to
go through a presidentially-created mechanism. Under the Reagan ad-
ministration, senators may recommend candidates directly to the Justice
Department-much as they do for district court positions. The Reagan
administration, however, has shown itself willing not only to scrutinize
candidates for circuit court positions more carefully but also to act on its
own candidates, even after a Republican senator has formally an-
nounced his own choices.
In choosing initial recommendation procedures and putting them into
practice, administrations are limited by the policies of the Senate Judici-
ary Committee. This is particularly true of the committee's role in en-
forcing senatorial courtesy through the blue slip custom. Thurmond's
policy differs from Kennedy's in failing to guarantee committee action
when a blue slip is withheld. Thurmond's decision to hold a hearing on
the nomination of Sam Bell without a blue slip from Senator Metzen-
baum may have been a significant development. It strongly suggests
that holding the blue slip will not be sufficient by itself to delay action
on a judicial nomination. Neither the Kennedy nor the Thurmond pol-
icy, however, has been tested by a senator belonging to the President's
party. Until that happens, ambiguities in the blue slip policy will
remain.
(2) Initial recommendation procedures and accomplishing the President's ideo-




to appoint judges who agreed with it philosophically but also to reform
the selection process itself in order to open it to more public participa-
tion and to encourage the selection of women and minorities. The
panels were useful to the Carter administration in accomplishing both
goals. In aiding its affirmative action goal, the panels created a broader
pool of applicants and candidates, particularly at the circuit court level.
At the district court level, panel systems were more likely to end in the
nomination of women and minorities than non-panel systems. The
panels also opened the selection process to greater participation, but the
administration was criticized for largely limiting that increased partici-
pation to other Democrats.
Unlike the Carter administration, which sought to appoint judges on
the basis of both ideology and "affirmative action," the Reagan admin-
istration has been more concerned with the former. The primary ideo-
logical goal of the Reagan administration is to appoint judges who will
follow "judicial restraint" in their decisionmaking. At the circuit level,
the administration has furthered its goal through the appointment of its
own candidates. At the district level, it has had some difficulty in per-
suading senators to send more than one name per vacancy. On both the
district and circuit levels, however, conservatives generally praise the
Reagan appointments.
The Reagan administration has also expressed its desire to appoint
women and minorities but has had difficulty in accomplishing this goal.
This is largely due, especially at the circuit level, to a restricted pool of
candidates that can meet administration standards in judicial philoso-
phy and legal experience. Since the administration generally relies on
the recommendations of senators in filling district court vacancies, it has
urged representatives of women and minority groups to give senators the
names of potential candidates. Since the 1984 election will bring in-
creased pressure on Republicans (senators as well as President Reagan)
to build electoral support and since many senators have already filled
vacancies with their first choices for judgeships, we may see an increase
in the number of women and minority appointees.
(3) Initial recommendation procedures and the background characteristics of the
nominees. Whether different recommendation procedures may lead to
the selection of judges with particular background characteristics has
long remained uncertain. While differences between panel and non-
panel nominees were strong in only a few cases, the data here indicate
that the emphases of panelists in screening applicants for federal judge-
ships were reflected in differences between the nominees selected
through panel systems and those selected through non-panel systems. In
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both administrations, panel nominees to the district courts were more
likely than non-panel nominees to have had judicial experience, service
as a government attorney, and law professor experience. They were
more likely to have high ABA ratings. Only with respect to the "pres-
tige" of the law school attended were results contrary to expectations
based on the qualities that panelists might emphasize. The differences
in background characteristics were more dramatic in the Reagan ad-
ministration than in the Carter administration. Nominees selected
through panel systems in the Reagan administration were more likely
than those selected through non-panel systems to have judicial experi-
ence and higher ABA ratings.
For the circuit courts, the difference between "Carter panel" and
"Reagan non-panel" did not follow the expectations derived for com-
paring district court nominees within a single administration. This may
be attributed to the differences in the goals and screening procedures of
the two administrations.
Discussion of the selection and confirmation of federal judges has
been complicated too long with the idea of eliminating "politics" in or-
der to establish "merit." Rather, a recognition that political and ideo-
logical factors play a role in judicial selection may help in evaluating the
utility of different recommendation procedures. Nominating panels in-
troduce a new bureaucracy; they will not eliminate political considera-
tions; they may not even markedly improve the quality of a federal
bench which already enjoys a high reputation. At the same time, how-
ever, they open the process to more participants; they invite greater pub-
lic scrutiny; they focus the selection process on professional
qualifications. When an act of Congress creates a large number of judg-
eships-as under the Omnibus Judgeship Act-the increased pressure
on participants in the judicial selection process may justify the use of the
panels. In any event, panels continue to be used in the selection of dis-
trict court judges and may well be on their way to a permanent position
in the history of the federal judicial selection process.
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